Since Partition, Pakistan has framed its national identity largely in opposition to a “Hindu” India, reinforcing the idea of religion as the foundation of the state. Yet Islam alone has never been sufficient for nation-building—otherwise the Arab world would not consist of 22 separate countries. The explanation lies in Islam’s internal diversity.
One influential strand of that diversity originated not in the Middle East, but in India.
Founded in 1866 in the Saharanpur district, the Deoband school of thought emerged during British rule, when Sunni Muslims were grappling with questions of religious identity. In an interview with StratNews Global, Dr Soumya Awasthi, Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, explains how this movement fractured as it spread across South Asia. Her book, Diverse Narratives and Shared Beliefs: Classical to Hybrid Deoband Islam in South Asia, traces three distinct trajectories—Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan.
“It began when Sunnis were trying to secure their religious identity because Christianity was at its peak during colonial rule,” Dr Awasthi says.
The original Indian Deoband movement was anti-colonial and India-centric. Its scholars opposed British rule and argued for unity during the freedom struggle. Crucially, they did not advocate a separate Muslim nation.
“They believed identity consolidation would help restore the influence lost after the Mughal era,” Dr Awasthi notes. “But that did not automatically mean Pakistan.”
This “Classical” Indian Deoband remains socially conservative and theologically strict, but not violent. Dr Awasthi distinguishes between fundamentalism and radicalism. “It adheres closely to scripture,” she says, “but interpretation and knowledge still allow flexibility.”
That distinction, she argues, collapses in Pakistan.
“In Pakistan, Deoband becomes rejectionist,” she says. “It insists Islam must be practised in one way, and that others—Christians, and even Shias—have no place.”
The shift from theology to militancy is reinforced through politicised religious narratives. Writing for the Hudson Institute, Husain Haqqani highlights how a disputed Hadith promising salvation to “the group that invades India” was used to legitimise hostility toward India. Indian scholars at Darul Uloom Deoband have rejected the so-called Ghazwa-e-Hind as fabricated.
“When you talk about Pakistan, it’s not just fundamentalist—it becomes extremist and radical,” Dr Awasthi says. “Extremists impose ideas; radicals use violence.”
Further west, Deoband ideology mutates again. In Afghanistan, Dr Awasthi describes a “Hybrid Deoband Islam”—a blend of Deobandi teachings, Saudi-influenced Wahhabism, and Pashtunwali tribal codes. While once a peak site of radicalisation, she notes that external violence has receded, even as internal issues—particularly around women—remain acute.
These divergences have led Indian Deoband scholars to clearly distance themselves from Pakistani interpretations. “They say, ‘We do not recognise that Islam,’” she notes.
Watch the full conversation with Dr Soumya Awasthi, unpacking these distinctions in greater depth, here.
