Renewed discussion of an “Islamic NATO” is no longer theoretical, following reports that Türkey is in advanced negotiations to join a Saudi Arabia–Pakistan mutual defence pact signed in September 2025.
While the term itself remains politically charged and imprecise, the reported talks point to a tangible development with potential consequences for regional security, particularly for India.
At its core, the debate reflects a move toward collective deterrence at a time when confidence in traditional security guarantors is perceived to be weakening.
The Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) marked a notable shift when it was concluded. Unlike earlier understandings, the pact reportedly contains language committing both sides to treat an attack on one as an attack on the other, drawing inevitable comparisons with North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Article 5, despite the absence of NATO-like institutional structures.
Former Indian diplomat Ambassador Dr Ausaf Sayeed, who’s served in Seychelles, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Denmark and Yemen among other countries, characterises the development as less ideological than strategic.
“The emerging defence alignment among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey—formally anchored in the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) inked in September 2025—is less an ‘Islamic NATO’ than a calculated response to the erosion of Western security guarantees in a multipolar world,” he told StratNewsGlobal. According to Sayeed, Riyadh’s pursuit of such arrangements dates back to the Arab Spring, aimed at institutionalising defence cooperation across the Gulf and the wider Muslim world.
Sayeed links the SMDA to earlier, more limited efforts. “The effort first took shape in the Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition (IMCTC), launched in 2015 with 34 member states. Although limited in impact, the IMCTC laid the groundwork for a more formal collective-defence arrangement after doubts over U.S. reliability deepened following Israel’s September 2025 strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar,” he said.
Both Riyadh and Islamabad have stated that the SMDA is defensive and not directed at any specific adversary. Formally, that position holds. Strategically, the agreement emerged amid heightened military activity across West Asia, uncertainty about long-term American commitments, and concern among regional powers about reliance on Washington for crisis response.
Sayeed notes that the SMDA signals a qualitative change. “The SMDA marks a shift from ad hoc partnerships to an institutionalised security mechanism. Its Article 5-style provision defines the trigger as ‘any aggression’ rather than NATO’s narrower ‘armed attack,’ a deliberate ambiguity that balances deterrence with discretion,” he said. He added that the framework allows members to “calibrate responses to diverse threat environments while signalling a shared intent to manage regional security without Western mediation.”
The possible inclusion of Türkey would move the arrangement beyond a bilateral signal. Turkey brings NATO-level operational experience, a combat-tested force structure, and a defence industry that has expanded into original design in drones, precision weapons, and electronic warfare. Ankara has also demonstrated a willingness to pursue policies independent of Western preferences, a factor shaping assessments of its potential role.
Analysts have begun referring to a Saudi–Pakistan–Türkey configuration as an “Islamic NATO” because of the complementary strengths involved—Saudi financial capacity, Pakistani nuclear and missile capabilities, and Turkish conventional military power—while acknowledging that there is no unified command, standing force, permanent headquarters, or agreed escalation doctrine.
For India, the implications are closely scrutinised. “The alliance’s combination of Saudi finance, Pakistani nuclear capability, and Turkish military technology strengthens Islamabad’s strategic position and complicates India’s deterrence calculus,” Sayeed said. “Even if not directed at South Asia, such a framework could embolden Pakistan and complicate crisis management.” He also cautioned that diplomatically it could strain India’s balancing act in West Asia, given its ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
On India’s response, Sayeed observed that New Delhi appears to be “deepening counter-alignments with the UAE and Israel through enhanced defence cooperation, joint exercises, and intelligence exchange,” while warning that such moves also carry risks of entanglement in intra-Gulf rivalries.
Not all former diplomats accept the framing itself. Ambassador Navdeep Suri, who’s served in places like Egypt and the UAE, cautioned against the label, saying simply, “We should not fall for such descriptions.”
There are also evident constraints on any such construct.
Türkey’s NATO membership introduces legal and political complexities, Saudi Arabia’s regional balancing limits overt militarisation, and Pakistan’s economic fragility raises questions of sustainability. The absence of Iran from these initiatives further underscores the limits of any pan-Islamic security framework, reinforcing the point that geopolitics, rather than identity, continues to define the boundaries of regional defence cooperation.
