Indians are the second largest community of foreign workers in Slovakia. Owing to recent changes in visa regulations, which raised the annual quota of work visas that nationals of developing countries can receive, Slovakia has seen a rise in the number of Indians working in information technology, academic research, car manufacturing, warehousing and logistics. There has also been an increase in cooks and masseurs.
In total, as of late 2025 there were 9200 Indian workers in the Central European country. As more Indians travel to Slovakia with the intention of making it their home, they might do well to remember that in the past, when Chinese businesses promised to invest in Slovakia, creating jobs and building up human capital, the response was less than ecstatic.
With many Indians seeking salaried jobs alongside locals, rather than being investors bringing in capital, the reaction of Slovaks is likely to be even more lukewarm despite good government-to-government ties.
Although relations between New Delhi and Bratislava are on an upswing, it would be useful to develop a longer-term perspective. Slovakia is a small country that is suspicious of larger powers. In autumn 2025, Prime Minister Robert Fico stated that the days were over when Czech politicians could lecture their Slovak counterparts.
This statement seems to reflect a defensive mindset that when Slovakia was part of Czechoslovakia, the Czechs, whose population is nearly double that of the Slovaks, would control affairs of state. A similar suspicion of foreign dominance has led Slovakia to be one of the European countries that is most suspicious of American hegemony.
On the one hand, Slovaks appreciate the security which they receive from being part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Slovak political elite sees America as a guarantor of their country’s independent existence.
On the other, opinion polls suggest that more Slovaks see the US as a threat to their country than China. This is not surprising, since China hardly features in the cultural consciousness of Central Europeans the way the United States does.
Robert Fico is more positive about relations with China and Russia than his immediate predecessor was. Since Fico’s latest election victory in 2023 (he has been in and out of power over the last two decades), more than 40 Slovak foreign service officials have been eased out of their posts.
Considered by some to be too pro-Western, they have been replaced by colleagues who graduated from diplomatic training institutes in Russia. This might indicate that Fico prioritizes relations with the ‘East’ over the ‘West’. Ever since he came to power, bilateral relations with Czechia have been chilly. The two countries retained close ties for 30 years after their separation, but on the Russia-Ukraine War, they have diverged with Slovakia being more open to Moscow.
Fico heads a leftist party which is not critical of Slovakia’s communist past, nor of diplomatic ties with Moscow and Beijing, the way political elites in post-communist states are inclined to be. He might also be hedging economic bets.
Slovakia is threatened by tariffs which US president Donald Trump has imposed on European Union car manufacturers. By keeping communications open with Moscow and Beijing, two power centres which are crucial to Slovakia’s current and future energy supplies (as the country transitions from fossil fuels to green technologies), Fico is positioning Slovakia to avoid heavy dependence on American energy imports.
Under Fico, there has been a degree of posturing about the closeness of Sino-Slovak relations. This has not been matched by results. When the Slovak prime minister visited Beijing in 2024 at the head of a high-powered delegation, he had just two concrete results to show for his efforts.
One was an agreement by China to allow visa-free entry to Slovak tourists and the second was reiteration that the Chinese battery-manufacturing company Gotion High-Tech would invest in a joint venture with Slovak startup InoBat. The agreement about this joint venture had already been concluded a year earlier, but the prime minister’s 2024 visit to Beijing served to remind the public about it.
There has been local opposition to the joint venture by Slovak rural communities, concerned about industrial pollution near their farmlands. Because the joint venture aims to produce batteries in a region where unemployment levels are already quite low, local businesses are worried that influx of foreign capital would lead to distortions in the labour market by driving wages up and forcing Slovak businesses to compete for employees.
Slovak intelligence has claimed that unnamed actors from China have been trying to build influence with local politicians by providing them with the services of sex workers. Public opinion about China seems to be largely indifferent, but tending towards negativity. Political elites are divided into three camps.
One camp, led by Fico’s party, is pragmatic about trading with all points of the compass regardless of ideological compatibility. Another camp is pro-Russian/pro-Chinese and anti-American. The third camp consists of Atlanticists who see Slovakia as belonging to the ‘West’ and are critical of both Russia and China. Between them, they hold each other in check with the default position being pragmatism, as indicated by Fico’s longevity in politics.
Chinese diplomats in Bratislava seem to be more focused on reaching out to their compatriots than connecting with local audiences, perhaps in order to avoid giving the impression that they are seeking to influence local debates.
When such diplomats have articulated their views in local news media, they have done so through outlets that are derided, rightly or wrongly, by other news sources for engaging in the spread of ‘disinformation’. Overall, despite China’s economic heft, the country seems to have little control over how it is perceived among Slovaks.
