Amid a U.S. “blockade” of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s demands for crypto payments, China is stepping up diplomacy to project itself as a global stabiliser.
At the same time, it is hardening its stance regionally—escalating tensions with Japan and the Philippines, courting Taiwan’s Kuomintang, and subtly reshaping its Taiwan strategy and timeline.
Whereas U.S. officials have warned for years that Beijing has been building up its military with the explicit goal of being ready to invade by 2027, China’s new narrative has refocused attention on Taiwan’s election the next year, pushing harder than ever the concept that a Kuomintang victory would avert conflict and offer much closer relations.
If Democratic Progressive Party retains power, China is signalling a tougher line—pressuring future United States administrations to step back from Taiwan while escalating tensions with Japan.
Beijing has blamed Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi for remarks that a Chinese takeover of Taiwan could threaten Japan’s survival.
Chinese officials and news outlets are also expressing concern that Tokyo might look to acquire nuclear weapons – something that might make it almost impossible for China to risk an attack against Taiwan or indeed Japan itself.
Takaichi’s government says it remains committed to Japan’s non-nuclear status. But it is keen to strengthen international relationships wherever possible, inviting more than 30 ambassadors from NATO and other nations to Tokyo from Wednesday to step up cooperation in defence and a host of other areas.
Elsewhere, China is making diplomatic gains, with Kuomintang leader Cheng Li-wun saying she would invite Xi Jinping to Taiwan if elected.
Meanwhile, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party is strengthening defences and watching for signs Donald Trump may scale back U.S. support for Taiwan.
Beijing Role Unclear
China’s role in the Iran crisis remains unclear, with Beijing denying reports of arms supplies while analysts point to possible “dual-use” support. Donald Trump has warned of tariffs if such links are proven.
As U.S. actions draw criticism in Europe, Beijing is positioning itself as a defender of trade and stability, though scepticism remains despite its growing diplomatic influence.
Lessons To Learn For China And Others
The lesson Beijing would most like the rest of the world to learn might be that when or if China’s military moves to take control of Taiwan – either because it has been invited in by the Kuomintang or because Xi’s patience has finally run out – the rest of the world should not get involved, whatever Japan or the U.S. might do.
While the U.S. may not have gained what it wanted from Operation Epic Fury, as with strikes on Tehran’s nuclear programme last June, the Pentagon has delivered a lesson to other potential foes that the U.S. military retains a level of expertise in complex operations that Beijing has never trialled in anger.
Xi’s confidence in his own military may only be mixed, at best, judging by the number of senior military commanders removed in recent months and years – although China’s sheer manufacturing capacity may still keep Pentagon planners up at night, their worries compounded by recent high usage of limited precision weapons stocks.
Beijing’s other major problem is that, so far at least, Taiwan’s always complex politics may not move in the direction that it wishes. It is far from clear whether KMT leader Cheng’s embrace of Beijing will win over voters – and even if it does, her language of rapprochement still stops well short of calling for annexation by China.
Nor is it clear that Beijing will do better in its efforts to isolate the new government in Tokyo, where for now it looks to be making little if any progress. European and Pacific nations’ worries about future U.S. policy have, if anything, made many of them more enthusiastic than before about working with Japan or South Korea.
Beijing has also yet to find its own way through the Gulf situation. Chinese-owned and -flagged oil tankers have periodically made it through Hormuz – but at nowhere near the pre-crisis rate. And the global supply chains on which China also depends are already looking rocky.
(With inputs from Reuters)
