China sceptics would have had that ‘I told you so’ moment when Beijing did nothing as the U.S. stormed Venezuelan President Maudro’s fortified complex and took him away for trial on various charges. Remember, China has invested heavily in Venezuela and buys a lot of its crude from there.
Cut to Iran, another country considered close to China, which has been under attack for the last month, and seen its top civil and military leadership eliminated with Beijing confining its actions to “diplomatic sympathy”, condemning the U.S. action and demanding a ceasefire.
“It has not offered security guarantees, direct military backing or the sort of costly intervention that would place China squarely in Tehran’s corner,” said Howard Zhang of the UK China Transparency, a think tank.
“In fact, many analysts and commentators within China feel that the government is not doing enough to protect its overseas interests—whether in Venezuela, Panama, or Iran,” says Antara Ghosal Singh of the ORF
Manoj Kewalramani of the Takshashila Institution argues that China does not view its global relationships through the lens of Western-style alliances.
“It doesn’t apply that frame,” he explained, adding that China’s partners are not treated like NATO allies with automatic security guarantees.
“Their concerns right now… are energy security and investment security,” Kewalramani pointed out. With vital oil routes such as the Strait of Hormuz at risk, Beijing’s focus is on stability rather than escalation.
This helps explain why Iran, despite close ties with China, is unlikely to receive strong military backing. As Zhang notes, “China will back Pakistan… but leave Iran exposed,” underscoring that not all partnerships carry equal weight.
Even in Pakistan’s case (during Operation Sindoor), China’s support has remained measured. “There was no sort of immediate emergency supplies,” Kewalramani said, noting that assistance was largely limited to providing signals, intelligence, and satellite information.
“It is an indirect admission,” says China scholar Suyash Desai, “that militarily it does not measure up to the US despite huge strides made in building up its armed forces in recent decades.”
China may react differently if something of this kind were to happen in waters it considers its own, such as the South China Sea, Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. Beijing projects an aggressive and intimidatory stance on these seas, demanding that all shipping seek permission before entering or transiting
Here Beijing leaves no one in any doubt that it seeks to topple the US from its perch as the world’s superpower. But that is for the long term.
In the short to medium term, it seeks to build resonance by describing the US-Israeli strikes as “illegal”, underscoring that the use of force must be UN sanctioned and laying out a structured peace framework.
It has also, quietly, provided Iran access to its Beidou satellite navigation network, and may have even supplied anti-ship missiles, air defence systems and components found in Iranian drones. That ties in with its stand that Iran has a right to defend itself.
As the U.S.–Iran conflict intensifies, China’s response appears to be cautious and ambiguous, but it is also calculated, seeking the greatest leverage at the lowest cost, avoiding any direct confrontation with the U.S. while preparing for the inevitable confrontation in the years ahead.
