Is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) dead? It’s clear that with Iran and the US choosing to make the Strait of Hormuz the focus of their conflict, the prospect of using the UAE as the entry point for Asian or Indian cargo is closed. Iranian missile and drone strikes on UAE infrastructure including its refineries has underscored its extreme vulnerability.
The UAE appears to have recognised this. It is investing over $2 billion to develop a major railway linking Jordan’s mining regions in the south and central parts of the country, to the Port of Aqaba on the Red Sea. It will carry about 16 million tonnes of cargo each year, including roughly 13 million tonnes of phosphate and 2.6 million tonnes of potash.
A joint venture, the UAE–Jordan Railway Company, will oversee the construction, operation, and maintenance of the network. The railway will eventually connect Aqaba with neighbouring Arab countries and extend links to Syria and Mediterranean ports, positioning Jordan as a regional logistics hub.
But the UAE is not alone here. Saudi Arabia, according to a report in middleeasteye.net, activated an international freight corridor last month linking the port of Jubail on the Persian Gulf in the east, to the Haditha border crossing with Jordan in the northwest, a distance of 1,700-km. It will cut by half the time taken by road transport.
Even before that, the Saudi Ports Authority and the Qatari Port Management had signed an MoU on land-sea connectivity, coordination and cooperation on joint maritime corridors, digital transformation and so on. This is how it will work:
Any shipping between Qatar’s Hamad Port in the southeast and Saudi Arabia takes 24 hours. From there Saudi Rail takes over direct to Jordan. The Saudis have also modified an old railway line running from Riyadh to Jordan (1,250-km) into a container line.
In other words, middleeasteye.net notes where earlier the UAE was the entry node for Asian/Indian goods, now it is Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The UAE’s role has transitioned to that of a downstream operator but no less powerful. Check this out:
Apart from its control over Aqaba Port in Jordan, Dubai’s DP World has a 30-year $800 million concession for Tatrus Port on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Operations began last November. Add to that, Abu Dhabi Ports has acquired a 20% stake in Latakia International Container Terminal, Syria’s main container facility.
So from Aqaba in Jordan to Tartus and Latakia the UAE is in control while inland, from the Persian Gulf coast to the Jordanian border, the Saudis run the show. This is a far cry from what Israel had hoped, that it would be the sole exit point for goods from Asia and the Arabian hinterland.
Now there are at least three exit ports with Israel’s Haifa a fourth, assuming this war ends. It’s also interesting to note that Israel’s ZIM Integrated Shipping, a leading global container operator, is owned by Germany’s Hapag Lloyd, where Saudi and Qatar sovereign funds have invested over 22%. Not very comfortable for Israel.
As for India, this may not be the IMEC as originally envisaged, nevertheless it is something which has potential given that two of its Gulf Arab partners are key players: UAE and Saudi Arabia. As for Israel’s Haifa Port where Adani has invested, it remains to be seen if after the war ends, how business and trade flows develop.
