One year after Operation Sindoor, India’s counter-terror strikes on Pakistan, the verdict from former diplomat and national security analyst Venkatesh Varma is blunt and unsentimental: War is not about global applause. It is about credibility, control and clarity of purpose.
Speaking on the anniversary of the strikes triggered by the Pahalgam terror attack, Varma describes the operation as a turning point in Indian statecraft. Not because it was the first punitive response, but because it broke with a long pattern of hesitation and calibrated restraint that often stopped short of restoring deterrence.
The key shift, he argues, lay in the alignment between political intent and military execution. After the attack, the political leadership made it clear that a punitive response was inevitable. What followed was not an improvised reaction but a planned escalation that went beyond Pakistan’s expectations, including strikes not just in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir but deeper inside its territory.
For Varma, the most important marker of success was not the scale of the strikes but the control exercised over escalation. India entered the conflict on its own terms and, crucially, exited on its own terms. That ability to define both the beginning and the end of military action is, in his view, the hallmark of mature statecraft.
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He points out that many conflicts today fail precisely on this count. From Ukraine to West Asia, wars have dragged on because the link between political objectives and military means has weakened or broken. Operation Sindoor, by contrast, maintained that discipline. India escalated when necessary, absorbed counter-escalation, and then terminated operations once its objectives were met.
That clarity, Varma suggests, restored a degree of deterrence that had eroded over decades of Pakistan-backed terrorism. For years, India operated under what he calls “strategic reticence”, shaped by outdated assumptions of clear boundaries between war and peace. Those assumptions collapsed as Pakistan sustained a grey-zone conflict through proxies. Sindoor marked a shift to recognising that India is in a semi-permanent state of conflict, requiring calibrated but decisive responses.
The operation also showcased improvements in civil-military coordination. Decision making, intelligence inputs, and operational execution were closely aligned. The armed forces, backed by political direction, executed a time-bound and objective-driven campaign. The Air Force carried the main operational burden, supported by the Army, while the Navy was positioned for escalation if required.
Equally significant was the performance of military systems. Varma highlights how indigenous platforms and adapted foreign systems both played a role. The lesson, he argues, is not autarky for its own sake but doctrine-driven capability. India must produce more of its own weapons, not just for economic reasons but to align technology with operational needs.
Yet, the operation also exposed gaps. Varma acknowledges that India’s communication during and after the strikes lacked coherence. In an era of what he calls “cognitive warfare”, the battle is not confined to the battlefield. Narratives, perception management, and information flows shape outcomes alongside kinetic action. India faced a formidable information environment, including coordinated messaging from Pakistan and China-backed platforms.
Still, he is clear that diplomacy did not constrain India’s military choices. The right to self-defence was exercised independently, and there was no external pressure that forced India to halt operations. The decision to stop, he insists, was taken because objectives had been achieved, not because of diplomatic compulsion.
Looking ahead, Varma outlines a set of lessons. First, India must deepen jointness across its armed forces. Sindoor demonstrated the benefits of coordinated action, but institutionalising that integration remains a work in progress. Second, defence production must scale up, including surge capacity for prolonged or attritional conflict. Third, doctrine must remain adaptive, combining indigenous capability with selective use of foreign systems tailored to Indian requirements.
He also emphasises the role of the wider national ecosystem. Modern conflict is not confined to the military. Industry, technology sectors and even public sentiment play a role. The participation of the private sector in defence manufacturing, he notes, is not just an economic activity but part of national security.
Ultimately, Varma frames Operation Sindoor as a beginning rather than a conclusion. The conflict, in his words, is paused, not ended. Future confrontations will not mirror the past. Each iteration will demand new responses, new capabilities and sharper coordination.
What remains constant is the principle that guided Sindoor. Military force, when used, must serve a clear political purpose, be applied with precision, and be withdrawn with control.
That, more than the strikes themselves, is what has reshaped India’s deterrence posture.
Watch the full interview to get more insights on one of the defining moments of India’s strategic history.
