As India and Bangladesh head toward renegotiations for the Ganga Waters Treaty this year, a geopolitical stress looms over this engineering deal. The treaty’s outcome will depend less on hydrology and more on politics, timing and good diplomacy, Uttam Kumar Sinha tells StratNews Global, on The Gist.
Sinha is a Senior Fellow at the MP-IDSA in New Delhi and a leading commentator on transboundary rivers. He says that the Ganga River, which is under negotiation, is no longer stable. “The 1996 data on which the treaty was formed has expired, and today we are dealing with the realities of climate change, reduced flows, erratic rainfall patterns and rising upstream demands, especially in India.”
However, another element here remains that Bangladesh’s political situation has evolved, too. “Ganga cannot be seen in isolation anymore. Bangladesh now has a wider strategic options, including its engagement with China.” This introduces an external variable into what was once a largely bilateral equation. In effect, the Ganga Waters Treaty will no longer be just a water-sharing negotiation. It is also about regional influence and strategic trust, says Sinha.
He adds that it will be a challenging negotiation; it must be kept in mind that the treaty is not starting from scratch. “In international water, diplomacy is a major asset. The degree of mutual dependence between India and Bangladesh is also quite high and both countries rely on predictable water flows for agriculture, livelihoods, and ecological stability; neither side benefits from uncertainty.” These commonalities will provide India a stronger incentive to reach an agreement, Sinha believes.
The best-case scenario, according to Sinha, would be “to move away from these rigid allocations towards a more flexible sharing band. The earlier treaty had very rigid allocations, but these won’t work when the river behaves unpredictably.”
He adds that flexibility allows for adjustment based on actual flows, especially during the lean season, so the deal can be far more resilient and less contentious.
Sinha also adds that water is no longer treated as a purely technical or developmental issue. It has become tied to questions of sovereignty and fairness. That makes the negotiation layered — and harder.
A well-negotiated Ganga Waters Treaty may gather some trust for India on the Teesta issue, but given its emotive nature, the Teesta negotiations may still be tough.
China’s involvement in river management and infrastructure projects in Bangladesh (on the Teesta) near India’s border adds a layer of complexity. “China’s financing and dredging along the Teesta is also the gradual expansion of influence in a geographically and politically sensitive region. For India, I think it has two clear implications. First, delay carries a cost. We need to seriously consider what to do with this treaty. The longer the issue remains unresolved between India and Bangladesh, the more space it creates for external actors to step in.”
Secondly, he adds, water diplomacy is no longer separate from a broader geopolitical competition. So India must keep in mind that it sits at the intersection of development, diplomacy and strategy. And China’s involvement makes that very explicit, adding a very complex layer of calculation for both India and Bangladesh.”
