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Premium Content

In mid-December, the administration of President Donald Trump announced $11.1 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, the largest ever U.S.
Carnicobar, Car Nicobar, Andaman & Nicobar Command, China, Tri-service
From the 2004 Tsunami tragedy to one of India's strategic springboards in the Andaman & Nicobar Command. 'Arc Of Power'
China’s “Justice Mission 2025” drills saw rockets fired toward Taiwan and heavy deployments of warships and aircraft, alarming regional and
Lai Ching-te
China's intensifying "grey zone" tactics around Taiwan hint at growing frustration over its intrasigence
India 2025, strategic ambiguity, choices, foreign policy
What India must avoid in 2026 is the temptation to constantly explain itself.
CIJWS Vairengte Mizoram, Indian Army, Counter Insurgency, Counter Terrorism, documentary
Watch Vairengte Warriors, Episode II on our sister channel BharatShakti.in
wto
The US is out to dismantle the WTO or restructure it on its own terms
China Galwan
Bollywood’s Battle of Galwan sparks outrage on China’s Weibo, with state media accusing India of distorting history.
Khaleda Zia, obituary, Battle of the Begums, India, Bangladesh, BNP,
Khaleda Zia’s long rivalry at home shaped how India engaged Bangladesh, making her years in power a test of New
India 2025, Strategic ambiguity, policy, choice
From Washington to Beijing, Russia to Dhaka, India was forced to shed illusion in favour of hard-edged realism in 2025.

Home Pentagon Awards $328M Lockheed Contract For Taiwan Arms Sales

Pentagon Awards $328M Lockheed Contract For Taiwan Arms Sales

The Pentagon announced on Wednesday a contract for Lockheed Martin to provide foreign military sales to Taiwan, addressing what U.S. officials described as an “urgent operational need” for the Taiwan Air Force.

The contract has a ceiling value of $328.5 million, with $157.3 million in foreign military sales funds obligated at the time of award, the Pentagon said in a statement.

Why It’s Important

Washington has formal diplomatic ties with China, but maintains unofficial ties with Taiwan and is the island’s most important arms supplier. The U.S. is bound by law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, though such arms sales are a persistent source of friction with China.

Taiwan remained on high alert on Wednesday after China staged massive military drills around the island the previous day, keeping its emergency maritime response centre running as it monitored Chinese naval maneuvers, the coast guard said.

Key Quotes

“This contract provides for the procurement and delivery of fifty-five Infrared Search and Track Legion Enhanced Sensor pods, processors, pod containers, and processor containers required to meet the urgent operational need of the Taiwan Air Force,” the Pentagon said.

It added that the contract’s work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, and is expected to be completed by June 2031.

Context

In mid-December, the administration of President Donald Trump announced $11.1 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, the largest ever U.S. weapons package for the island which is under increasing military pressure from China.

China claims democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, and it has not ruled out using force to take it under Chinese control. Taiwan, which rejects China’s claims, condemned the latest drills as a threat to regional security and a blatant provocation.

(With inputs from Reuters)

Home From Tsunami Ruins to Tri-Service Bastion: Inside Andaman & Nicobar Command’s Carnic

From Tsunami Ruins to Tri-Service Bastion: Inside Andaman & Nicobar Command’s Carnic

Carnicobar: ANC’s Middle Bastion

On December 26, 2004, a monstrous wall of water shattered Carnicobar, killing 122 air warriors and family members and redrawing the coastline forever. But from the ruins of that devastating tsunami, a strategic powerhouse emerged. Today, Carnicobar serves as a linchpin of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), acting as a springboard for Indo-Pacific security. Beneath the waves lie haunting “Ghost Towns,” but above them, C-130J Super Hercules and elite paratroopers guard the world’s most critical sea lanes. This documentary is the story of a sentinel reborn. It is the story of Carnicobar: ANC’s middle bastion.

Series In 4K

Watch this series in 4K. Click the gear icon in YouTube’s settings and choose 2160p/4K, if your device is compatible. We recommend big screen viewing for the best experience. This episode aired on Dec 27, 2025. It hit 100,000+ views on Jan 1, 2026.

Arc Of Power: Episode 7

In Part VII of our Arc Of Power series, we journey to the strategic heart of the ANC: Carnicobar. Through high-octane sequences of C-130J Super Hercules operations and elite paratrooper drills, we explore how this remote outpost guards the world’s most critical maritime choke-points. Episode 7 documents a sentinel reborn, standing as a testament to India’s maritime resilience and strategic foresight.

Located roughly 1,800 kilometers from mainland India, Carnicobar (also spelt Car Nicobar) is more than a picturesque island; it is a “middle bastion” for the ANC. Its proximity to the Six Degree and Ten Degree Channels allows India to monitor the Malacca Strait, through which 80% of China’s energy imports travel.

Military Might: The Springboard

The airbase, originally laid by the Japanese in the 1940s, now hosts a range of sophisticated platforms. From P-8I long-range surveillance aircraft to Mi-17 V5 helicopters, the station ensures 24/7 readiness across a massive Area of Responsibility (AoR). During recent drills like Exercise Kavach, C-130J aircraft demonstrated the ability to launch airborne assaults directly from the mainland to these remote outposts.

The 2004 Tsunami permanently altered the island. The air station has been rebuilt stronger, and regular tsunami drills now ingrain survival strategies into the community.

‘Arc Of Power’ Series

A StratNews Global team of Amitabh P. Revi, Rohit Pandita and Vashisht Mattoo document this series. Deepankar Verma provides all the informational graphics. In case you missed:

👉Andaman & Nicobar Command. ‘Arc Of Power’ Episode I | Rutland Beach Joint Service Amphibious Assault.

👉INS Kohassa: Eyes In The Sky, Punch In The Sea, Khukris On The Beach— ANC | Arc Of Power, Episode II.

👉Andaman Nicobar Command: India’s Strategic Outpost | C-in-C, Air Marshal Saju Balakrishnan Exclusive | Episode III.

👉Tarasa, Tiger & Tamannaah—Andaman & Nicobar Command, Arc Of Power Part IV: Outpost To Springboard.

👉Andaman & Nicobar Command: In Conversation With The Commanding Officer INS Saryu | Arc of Power Episode V.

👉 9 Days On INS Saryu; A Sailor’s Life At Sea, A Home Away From Home | Andaman & Nicobar Command. Episode VI.

Home Taiwan On Alert As China Ends Massive Drills

Taiwan On Alert As China Ends Massive Drills

Taiwan stayed on high alert on Wednesday, following China’s large-scale military exercises around the island a day earlier. The coast guard reported that its emergency maritime response center continued operating as it tracked Chinese naval movements.

China’s “Justice Mission 2025” drills saw rockets fired toward Taiwan and heavy deployments of warships and aircraft, alarming regional and Western allies. Beijing declared the exercises complete but vowed to stay on high alert. Taiwan’s defense ministry responded that its forces would maintain contingency measures as Chinese planes and vessels remained nearby.

Taiwan’s defence ministry on Wednesday said 77 Chinese military aircraft and 25 navy and coast guard vessels had been operating around the island in the past 24 hours.

Among them, 35 military planes had crossed the Taiwan Strait median line that separates the two sides, it added.

‘Stern Warning’

As the war games unfolded, United States Ambassador to China David Perdue posted on X a photo of himself with the ambassadors from countries in the Quad, a grouping that includes the U.S., Australia, Japan and India.

In the post, he called the Quad a “force for good” working to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific but gave no details about what the meeting discussed or when it took place.

The U.S. State Department said Perdue regularly meets with diplomats and Chinese officials to advance the U.S. president’s agenda. “In line with these routine meetings he met with Quad Ambassadors in Beijing on December 19”, a State Department spokesperson told Reuters.

The drills, China’s most extensive war games by coverage area to date, forced Taiwan to cancel dozens of domestic flights and dispatch jets and warships for monitoring. Soldiers ran rapid-response drills including putting up barricades at various locations.

China’s state news agency Xinhua published an article summarising “three key takeaways” from the drills, which began 11 days after the United States announced a record $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan.

The simulated “encirclement” demonstrated the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to “press and contain separatist forces while denying access to external interference – an approach summarised as ‘sealing internally and blocking externally’,” the article said, citing Zhang Chi, a professor at the PLA National Defence University.

(With inputs from Reuters)

Home What China’s Latest Military Drills Around Taiwan Signal

What China’s Latest Military Drills Around Taiwan Signal

By any stretch of imagination, it’s hard to justify China’s latest round of military muscle-flexing around Taiwan as justice of any kind.

But “Justice Mission 2025” is what they have called it, a two-day operation involving, according to Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, 130 sorties by Chinese military aircraft, 14 naval vessels and eight other ships with lots of fireworks.

This is the sixth round of Chinese military exercises around Taiwan ever since they began in 2022 when Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, visited the island.

The rhetoric from Beijing was tough as usual with the foreign ministry spokesman calling it “A punitive and deterrent action against separatist forces who seek Taiwan independence through military buildup, and a necessary move to safeguard China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

The words “punitive” and “deterrent” does suggest China was retaliating against the recent US announcement of an $11 bn arms package for the island nation.

Top diplomat Wang Yi said his country would “forcefully counter” US arms sales and any attempt to obstruct unification with the island “will inevitably end in failure”.

Taiwan’s President Lai-Ching-tei criticised the drills, noting that this is “not something that a responsible power should do.  We will act responsibly and not escalate conflict or stir up disputes,” he said adding that the military “will do their best to ensure the safety of the country,”

In India, PLA watchers say the exercises around Taiwan would have been an opportunity for top commanders to hone their “Cold Start” doctrine, which basically involves mobilising and deploying land, naval and air assets at very short notice.

Incidentally, PLA scholar Suyash Desai told StratNewsGlobal that President Xi Jinping recently promoted the Taiwan-focused Eastern Theater Commander to the rank of  general, which signals full combat readiness.

Aligned with the Eastern Theater Command is the Southern Theater Command which is responsible for the South China Sea, both would have been tasked with executing the latest round of muscle-flexing in the Taiwan Strait.

It also underscores the other point that Taiwan remains the “primary strategic direction” for the Beijing establishment (even as India has got an “upgrade”, now ranking just below Taiwan).

But do these exercises tell us anything about Chinese military capabilities?

Desai believes “They are reforming the military, like no one else. They are trimming the forces because it was a large military. They are buying newer equipment. There is a lot of argument whether PLA equipment is good or not, we don’t know.”

But the PLA brass is focused on future warfare, whether Cold Start or Multi-Domain Integrated Operations. So those are positives from their point of view. The current round of military drills around Taiwan are also expected to help refine their “grey zone tactics, basically coercive actions just short of war.

There is another point these exercises throw up: Desai believes based on his study of the PLA, that motivation is low because of the purge of top ranking generals carried out by Xi Jinping.  How does that impact on wartime readiness?

The PLA will mark its 100th anniversary in April 2027, which is the deadline set by Xi for the force to be fully modernised and strategically capable. That year could also mark the decisive push for “armed unification” with Taiwan, possibly an invasion.

Xi may prefer a negotiated solution perhaps with some Western guarantees but the current geopolitical situation may rule that out.  The longer he waits, domestic economic uncertainties may become major hurdles to a military solution.  Xi  has tough choices ahead and limited time to ensure success.

 

 

 

Home India’s Next Test Is Strategic Choice

India’s Next Test Is Strategic Choice

Part I: 2025 Ends India’s Strategic Comfort Zone

If 2025 was about hardening, 2026 will be about choosing between habits and outcomes.

The most immediate challenge lies in managing parallel tracks that increasingly pull in opposite directions. India will deepen security coordination within the Quad even as it prepares to assume a leadership role in BRICS.

This is not a contradiction in New Delhi’s eyes, but it will be treated as one by others.

The Quad expects clarity on maritime security, technology standards, and China. BRICS is drifting—unevenly—toward debates on de-dollarisation, financial autonomy, and post-Western institutional reform.

India need not be the loudest voice in either camp. But it must be the most precise.

That precision is missing in parts of India’s multilateral posture. SAARC was abandoned and BIMSTEC promoted as an alternative, yet BIMSTEC now drifts—under-resourced and politically inert.

India sits within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation while doing little to strengthen its cohesion and at times signalling scepticism from within. India remains in BRICS even as the grouping edges toward de-dollarisation, a project New Delhi openly resists.

India has also walked a tightrope while balancing its ties with Israel and the Arab world, including Iran and Saudi Arabia. And in a move that raised some eyebrows, it opened up to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, stopping just short of formal recognition.

None of these positions is illegitimate on its own. But together, they raise a basic question: what exactly is India trying to achieve through these platforms?

China, meanwhile, is not waiting. It will continue pressing along the Line of Actual Control without crossing crisis thresholds. It will expand naval presence in the Indian Ocean while denying strategic intent. It will tighten economic and technological ecosystems even as globalisation fragments. The danger for India is fatigue, complacency, and failing to recognise that China prefers to restrain India, not go to war with it.

Against this backdrop, 2026 should be shaped by four deliberate policy moves.

First, lock in deterrence as a system, not a reaction.

The LAC posture has already shifted from temporary to permanent. What remains is institutional follow-through: predictable funding, logistics that assume winter as default, and political messaging that treats the border as a standing condition rather than a diplomatic failure. With Pakistan, deterrence must remain calibrated and unemotional. The objective is not dialogue or dominance but denying space for escalation, mediation theatre, or narrative inversion.

Second, treat defence exports as strategy.

BrahMos sales in 2025 were not just proof of concept; they were a signal. In 2026, India should formalise a tiered export doctrine with clear rules on where, when, and why systems are offered. This allows India to shape regional balances without inheriting regional conflicts.

Third, assume a fractured monetary order.

India should resist grandstanding while quietly expanding settlement options, currency-swap frameworks, and financial interoperability with trusted partners. As BRICS chair, India’s value lies in moderation—preventing the forum from hardening into an anti-Western bloc while acknowledging legitimate concerns over financial concentration and sanctions overreach.

Finally, make neighbourhood policy execution-driven.

With Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, India’s advantage is not ideology or civilisational rhetoric, although these cannot be wished away. It is proximity plus speedy delivery. Power grids, fuel supply, digital public infrastructure, and disaster response capabilities matter more than sanctimonious speeches or summits.

Beyond these choices lies a quieter frontier: geography itself. The Arctic is no longer peripheral. Shorter trade routes, energy access, and reduced chokepoint dependence make northern passages strategically relevant. India’s engagement must be scientific, commercial, and diplomatic—aligned with resilience rather than symbolism.

What India must avoid in 2026 is the temptation to constantly explain itself.

Strategic autonomy does not require narration. It requires consistency. Partners will test resolve. Rivals will probe thresholds. Some will try to force binary choices. The correct response is sequencing—knowing when to move, when to wait, and when to stay silent.

India is no longer operating in a system designed for its rise. It is operating in one strained by others’ decline, anxiety, and revisionism. This requires knowing the difference between adjustment and strategy. And the high cost of indecision.

Home Inside India’s Elite Counter-Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School; Vairengte Warriors Part II

Inside India’s Elite Counter-Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School; Vairengte Warriors Part II

CIJWS Training Ground

The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) in Vairengte, Mizoram is globally recognized as a training ground for modern warfare. Conceived under the vision of a future Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, CIJWS has evolved from its early role in combating insurgents in India’s North East into a world-class hub for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism training. Today, CIJWS prepares soldiers from India and abroad to excel in hostile terrains, asymmetric warfare, and unpredictable combat scenarios.

Vairengte Warriors Documentary: Episode II

Episode II of the “Vairengte Warriors” documentary series on our sister channel BharatShakti.in captures the visceral intensity of reflex firing drills. Soldiers are trained to:

  • React instantly to ambushes.
  • Adjust firing positions dynamically.
  • Master ambidextrous shooting techniques.
  • Adapt to uphill and downhill firing angles.
  • Maintain composure under extreme stress

Major Abhishek Rawat, a CIJWS Instructor, explains that reflex firing is designed to hard-wire instinctive responses into muscle memory, ensuring soldiers can react subconsciously in life-or-death situations.

👉 Watch the series in 4K Ultra HD on YouTube by selecting 2160p/4K. For maximum impact, view it on a big screen.

Produced by the BharatShakti team—Amitabh P. Revi, Rohit Pandita, and Ankit Mattoo—with graphics by Purnima Singh and Deepankar Verma.

Information & Research Centre (IRC)

Beyond the firing range, CIJWS’s Information and Research Centre (IRC) bridges theory and practice. Officers immerse themselves in:

  • Insurgency case studies.
  • Global terrorism trends.
  • Military innovations and doctrines.

Major Manish Bansal highlights CIJWS’s historic role in the 1971 war, underscoring its operational legacy and continued relevance in shaping modern military strategy.

Special Heliborne Operations

At the CIJWS helipad, Indian and foreign officers rehearse special heliborne operations. An Indian Air Force Mi-17 helicopter inserts troops onto a drop zone (DZ) for slithering drills. Soldiers descend ropes with precision, secure perimeters, and advance in buddy pairs.

Capt. Sandeep emphasizes that these drills replicate real-world raids, teaching:

  • Stealth and synchronization.
  • Fire-and-move tactics.
  • Rapid perimeter control.

CIJWS – Conditioning Ground for Modern Warfare

CIJWS is more than a school. It is a conditioning ground where skill, drill, will, and guile converge to kill (a school catch phrase). Its alumni, from India and across the world, carry forward lessons that shape modern counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism warfare.

Missed Episode I? Watch “Counter-Insurgency, Jungle Warfare Masterclass: Meet The CIJWS Commandant | Vairengte Warriors”.

Home US Peddles WTO “Reform”, Goal Is To Restructure To Suits Its Interests

US Peddles WTO “Reform”, Goal Is To Restructure To Suits Its Interests

“The point to remember in respect of the two recent free trade agreements with Oman and New Zealand is that both are not very large economies.  They already are fairly open. New Zealand has one of the lowest customs duties anywhere in the world.

“So the incremental gain for our exports from the free trade agreements with both Oman and New Zealand are not likely to be very significant.”

That’s the word from Abhijit Das, former head of the Centre  for WTO Studies, during a conversation on The Gist.

He underscored that “Our exports will certainly grow. But the free trade agreements with these two countries cannot really provide the huge boost, the huge momentum to propel our exports to a higher trajectory.”

Equally significant is what he had to say about US moves to “reform” the World Trade Organisation (WTO), set up by the West with the idea of promoting multilateral rules-based trade. Today, the US is seeking to reverse that.

“What we had been suspecting all along for the past few years is, you know, out there at the WTO in writing in black and white. So that leaves no one in any doubt about the motivations and the objectives that the United States wants to pursue.”

The US is challenging the most favoured nation principle, a cornerstone of the WTO, that gives less developed and poorer nations, concessions in terms of their exports to the markets of the rich nations.  Donald Trump wants this ended and his reciprocal tariffs have already hit that principle.

Nor does Trump like the “special and differential” treatment for poorer countries, demanding that this apply only to Least Developed Countries and only for a transitory period.

It is also undermining the multilateral and consensus based decision making nature of the WTO with pluri-lateral arrangements. These are agreements signed on by a limited number of WTO members but the US wants such agreements to be included in the WTO rule book.

Given the huge power asymmetry between the US, Europe and Japan on one side, and countries like India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria and others lined up opposite, the latter are at a huge disadvantage and it remains to be seen how they can come together to take on the rich world. This is not a battle that can be fought by individual nations.

Tune in for more in this conversation with Abhijit Das, former  head of the Centre for WTO Studies.

Home Battle of Galwan: When a Bollywood Trailer Got China Nervous

Battle of Galwan: When a Bollywood Trailer Got China Nervous

You can never tell what will excite social media and in the case of China’s Weibo, which is state-controlled, the mandarins may find even obscure developments of use to them.

This is not to suggest the Battle of Galwan is obscure. This Bollywood production starring Salman Khan as Col. Santosh Babu, commanding officer of the 16th battalion of the Bihar Regiment, who was killed by PLA troops in the Galwan valley in an unjustified attack, is scheduled for release in April 2026 and is widely expected to perform well (meaning heat up anti-China sentiment), which explains Weibo’s interest.

China’s state-run Global Times (GT) has dismissed the film as “exaggerated”, claiming it is a “one-sided portrayal” of an event which threw bilateral relations into the deep freeze for four years. It said the film would “stir nationalist sentiment rather than reflecting historical facts”.

Global Times

Beijing’s Self-Serving Critique

The criticism appears rather self-serving given how the mandarins have repeatedly used the media to drum up nationalist sentiment whether against India or even Japan, Taiwan, the US to name a few.

GT then quoted various Chinese experts as saying that Indian troops crossed the Line of Actual Control first and stressed that cinematic drama cannot weaken “the PLA’s resolve to defend its territorial claims”.

That was enough to get Weibo going: verified accounts openly mocked the film, accusing India of distorting history. One post sneered that India “still hasn’t been beaten enough” and was back to twisting facts.

A blogger on Weibo posted: “The trailer of the Indian film ‘Battle of Galwan’ is out. Looks like they still haven’t been beaten enough now they’re back to distorting the facts again!”

Another argued that if China does not put forward its own narrative, international audiences exposed primarily to Indian films may end up accepting that version of events. This helps explain why a verified Weibo handle run by the Shanghai Han Weiyang Traditional Culture Promotion Centre published a post on December 30 titled “An Epic of Heroes from the Galwan Valley,” adopting an overtly emotive and nationalist tone.

It framed the valley as a strategically decisive frontier, and PLA soldiers as “resolute guardians of sovereignty”, rather dramatically describing them as “Han soldiers are like the sun and moon, shining over frost and snow; looking back, all enemies are swept away.” (Screenshot below)

Shanghai Han Weiyang Traditional Culture Promotion Centre published a post on December 30th titled “An Epic of Heroes from the Galwan Valley,”

Some bloggers also shared images from the Galwan border zone showing a slogan carved onto a mountainside (screenshot below), which reads, “Magnificent rivers and mountains not an inch of land will be yielded.” Commonly used in official and popular discourse, the slogan reflects the idea that every part of the country’s territory is non-negotiable and must be defended without compromise.

Another verified Weibo blogger reflected a Chinese fear: “The Indian fantasy film ‘Battle of Galwan’ has released its trailer once again pushing a self-gratifying storyline where one man takes on hundreds. Honestly, we should make our own film too. If we don’t tell the facts ourselves, most people will only see Indian movies and quite a few will actually believe the Indian version.”

The last reflects a point made earlier here, that given China’s low international credibility driven largely by state-controlled media prone to purveying propaganda, don’t rule out a Beijing riposte to Bollywood’s Galwan.

Home Battle Of The Begums And Khaleda Zia’s India Legacy

Battle Of The Begums And Khaleda Zia’s India Legacy

Begum Khaleda Zia, the first woman to serve as prime minister of Bangladesh, has died at the age of 80, leaving behind a complex legacy in her nation’s politics and in South Asia’s diplomatic history.

As the long-time leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Zia shaped Bangladesh’s domestic life for over three decades and played a defining role in Dhaka’s relations with its giant neighbour, India — a relationship marked by periods of strain, cautious cooperation, and mutual diplomatic regard even amid deep political differences.

Born 15 August 1945 in Jalpaiguri, then part of British India, Khaleda Zia’s early years were rooted in a shared South Asian past before partition reshaped the subcontinent. Her family moved to Dinajpur in East Bengal (now Bangladesh) after 1947, embodying the complex human history that underlies modern India-Bangladesh ties.

Zia entered politics reluctantly after the assassination of her husband, President Ziaur Rahman, in 1981. Taking the reins of the BNP—a party he had founded—she transformed herself from political novice to one of the most formidable leaders in Bangladesh. She led the nation as prime minister three times across the 1990s and early 2000s, spearheading the return to parliamentary democracy and implementing key domestic reforms.

Yet, her relationship with India was complex, shifting between cooperation, suspicion, and strategic distancing — reflecting both ideological differences and geopolitical realignments in the region.

The broader arc of Khaleda Zia’s career was dominated by her intense rivalry with Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League. Known as the “Battle of the Begums,” this rivalry shaped Bangladeshi politics for decades and coloured perceptions in New Delhi, where the Awami League was often viewed as a more familiar partner due to its historic ties with India.

During her early years in power, Zia and the BNP cultivated a foreign policy that was notably cautious towards India. This stance was shaped in part by her party’s ideological orientation and historical concerns about India’s influence in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. The BNP’s foreign policy under Khaleda often emphasized balancing relations with multiple powers — including the Muslim world, the West, and China — and was sceptical of undue Indian influence.

As one academic analysis notes, elements within Khaleda Zia’s leadership at times held India responsible for broader regional dynamics that they viewed as unfavourable, and this perception influenced Dhaka’s diplomatic posture in the 1990s.

During this period, ties with India were tense, particularly over trade imbalances, water sharing, and border management issues. While Bangladesh and India had established formal diplomatic relations after 1971, lingering mistrust often undercut deeper cooperation when Khaleda’s BNP was in power.

But despite ideological reservations, Khaleda Zia did undertake high-level engagement with India. Official visits to New Delhi and meetings with Indian leaders were part of the diplomatic routine, even as her government maintained a cautious approach to bilateral issues. Reports from past research show that her visits often included discussions on critical matters like water sharing, trade, and border agreements — matters that remain central to India-Bangladesh relations.

These interactions highlighted the pragmatic side of her leadership. Even when the BNP’s rhetoric was wary, practical diplomacy continued. For example, during visits and negotiations, Indian officials engaged with her government on issues of mutual concern, seeking to bridge gaps while advancing cooperation.

The longstanding rivalry between Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina profoundly influenced Bangladesh’s internal politics and, by extension, its foreign relations. The two leaders alternated power for decades in a deeply polarized political landscape. India traditionally maintained a closer relationship with Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, whose party roots traced back to the Bangladeshi independence movement of 1971.

In contrast, the BNP’s nationalist ideology and its alliance with more conservative forces in Bangladesh made India more cautious about deep strategic engagement during Khaleda’s tenures. Over time, this divergence shaped the character of India-Bangladesh relations, with cooperative thrusts often occurring under Awami League governments and cooler phases under BNP leadership.

In her later years, as Khaleda Zia’s health deteriorated and she stepped back from active politics, overtures between India and the BNP leadership took on new significance. In 2025, amidst broader shifts in Dhaka’s political landscape, there were signs that India was exploring ways to broaden ties beyond traditional allies. Reports from recent weeks suggest that messages and gestures from Indian leadership to Khaleda Zia while she was ailing were interpreted by some analysts as India’s attempt to foster goodwill with the BNP ahead of pivotal elections.

These gestures hinted at a diplomatic evolution, where bilateral relations might transcend the personal rivalries of Bangladesh’s two most prominent political families. Such moves underscored the enduring importance New Delhi places on stable, multifaceted ties with Dhaka — irrespective of which party leads Bangladesh.

Khaleda Zia’s legacy in India-Bangladesh relations is neither straightforward nor uniformly adversarial. Instead, it reflects the ebb and flow of geopolitical and domestic calculations: early scepticism tempered by pragmatic diplomacy, ideological caution counterbalanced by mutual interests, and later attempts at rapprochement amid changing political currents.

Her political path — from reluctant entry into politics to decades at the centre of power — illustrates how personal leadership and national strategy can intersect with regional relationships. For India, her tenure was a reminder that Dhaka’s foreign policy orientation would often be shaped by internal political dynamics as much as by external factors.

As South Asia contemplates the impact of her passing, Khaleda Zia’s life offers a lens on the complexities of Bangladesh’s engagement with India — marked by wariness, negotiation, competition, and ultimately recognition that stable ties between neighbouring democracies are essential for peace and prosperity in the region.

Her death not only marks the end of a defining chapter in Bangladeshi politics but also invites reflection on the evolving nature of India-Bangladesh cooperation in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.

Home 2025 Ends India’s Strategic Comfort Zone

2025 Ends India’s Strategic Comfort Zone

If 2024 was about political mandate, 2025 was the year India’s external environment stripped away remaining illusions. The neighbourhood grew more competitive, great-power pressure became more explicit, and strategic ambiguity proved less forgiving.

The most consequential recalibration unfolded with the United States. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington early in the year reaffirmed strategic continuity, but old frictions quickly returned. The second Trump presidency reintroduced a bluntly transactional tone. Tariff threats resurfaced, underscoring that strategic convergence does not shield partners from economic leverage.

More politically sensitive were repeated claims by Donald Trump that Washington had “brokered” calm between India and Pakistan. The Prime Minister went to Parliament and denied any such role—effectively calling the US president a liar. The denial was necessary, but the optics were costly.

The real question is not whether Trump exaggerated—he often does—but whether India misjudged how little narrative restraint this White House would exercise, even with long-standing partners.

That misreading mattered because it intersected with a deeper shift. The US resumed limited engagement with Pakistan—not as a pivot or favour, but as a contingency hedge. Washington once again signalled that it would keep multiple South Asian channels open, regardless of Indian discomfort.

Despite this friction, Indo-US defence and technology cooperation continued to move forward. Co-production discussions, advanced platform access, jet-engine collaboration, space coordination, and semiconductor supply-chain initiatives progressed precisely because they were insulated from headline politics.

If the US relationship required balance, ties with Russia demanded calibration.

President Vladimir Putin’s December visit to India for the annual summit reaffirmed defence and energy cooperation, signalling continuity despite Western pressure. For Moscow, India remains a critical partner; for New Delhi, Russia remains a reliable friend, but not the only one.

At the same time, 2025 made the costs of that relationship more explicit. Western scrutiny of India’s Russian oil purchases and legacy defence dependence persisted, pushing India to accelerate diversification rather than posture defiance. The visit sent a deliberate message: India would not abandon old partnerships to validate new ones, but neither would it mortgage future flexibility to sentiment.

Defence ties with France deepened further, building on earlier fighter and submarine cooperation. New deals and follow-on negotiations covering aircraft, naval platforms, and advanced munitions reinforced Paris’s position as India’s most politically reliable Western defence partner, less prone to sanctions pressure or strategic conditionality.

Perhaps the clearest marker of India’s strategic maturation came not from imports, but exports.

BrahMos missile sales gathered momentum in 2025 as India positioned the system as a credible deterrence tool for friendly regional states. The 2023 delivery of the first BrahMos batch to the Philippines was a watershed. If ongoing negotiations with Vietnam and Indonesia conclude, the significance will go well beyond revenue—signalling India’s arrival as a selective but serious defence exporter capable of shaping regional military balances.

All of this unfolded against the unchanging backdrop of China. Border talks continued without resolution—and crucially, without expectation. There was no Modi–Xi reset and no informal summitry. India’s force posture along the LAC normalised permanence; infrastructure acceleration became routine. China is no longer a crisis to be managed, but a condition to be planned around.

This hardening forced India into a delicate global juggling act—deepening security coordination within the Quad while preparing for BRICS chairmanship, navigating debates on de-dollarisation, and absorbing the turbulence unleashed by Trump’s disruptive approach to trade, alliances, and institutions.

Strategic autonomy in 2025 was no longer about balance for its own sake, but about surviving a stressed system without being pulled into another power’s orbit.

That realism filtered into India’s neighbourhood policy. With Pakistan, deterrence replaced dialogue. With Bangladesh, political uncertainty was met with non-partisan engagement and institutional continuity.

In Nepal, nationalist rhetoric was countered not with rebuttal but with electricity exports, connectivity, and patience. In Sri Lanka, India stepped out of the spotlight as Colombo stabilised, confident that delivery had earned credibility.

India’s neighbourhood is no longer a comfort zone. Its great-power relationships—especially with the US, Russia, and France—are no longer ideological anchors but calibrated instruments.

Strategic autonomy, once a slogan, has become a discipline enforced by hard choices.

Next: India’s Next Test Is Strategic Choice