On October 3, 2024, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Prime Minister of Mauritius Pravind Kumar Jugnauth authorised a joint statement on the Chagos Archipelago, including the island of Diego Garcia, which hosts a key military facility jointly operated by US and UK in the middle of the Indian Ocean.
Sovereignty Of Chagos Islands
The statement announced the decision of both sides to conclude a treaty over the transfer of sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, including Diego Garcia, and ensure the long-term operation of the military base on Diego Garcia by UK (and by implication, the U.S.). Other notable aspects of the joint statement include implementation of a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago (other than Diego Garcia), and creation of a Mauritian Marine Protected Area.
The text brings out that UK and Mauritius will cooperate on environmental protection, maritime security, combating illegal fishing, irregular migration and drug and people trafficking within the Chagos Archipelago. Financial support will be provided to Mauritius by the UK, including annual indexed payments and creation of a trust fund for the Chagossian people who were displaced from the islands by colonial Britain between 1968 and 1973. In effect, the joint statement pulls a curtain over the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), as the islands have been called till now.
Victory For Mauritius
It is a political and moral victory for Mauritius, which has been pursuing the case for regaining sovereignty of Chagos islands since decades, at various international forums. A major breakthrough came on February 25, 2019, when the judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Hague, declared in a majority ruling that London was under an obligation to end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible.
On May 22, 2019, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution declaring that the archipelago was part of Mauritius. On November 3, 2022, British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly announced that the UK and Mauritius had decided to begin negotiations on sovereignty over the BIOT, considering the international legal proceedings. The recent political agreement is an outcome of this nearly two years long process.
Personally, for Mauritian Prime Minister Pravind Jugnauth, it marks a defining point of an issue that his late father Sir Aneerod Jugnauth, pursued all through his political life. The senior Jugnauth, who also formerly served as the Prime Minister and later President, reportedly argued the case for Mauritius at the ICJ hearings in 2018.
Diego Garcia
The geopolitical centerpiece of this development is the military base on Diego Garcia, which UK, through exchange of notes in 1966, permitted the United States to use for defence purposes for 50 years until December 2016, followed by a 20-year extension (to 2036). The base was initially developed as a naval communications station but was subsequently expanded as a naval support facility and has been used by the U.S. for critical military missions in Asia since the 1990s. This includes bomber aircraft missions in the two Gulf wars, operations in Middle East (including Afghanistan) and other important replenishment functions for U.S. and allied military units.
The facilities on the island have been enhanced over time to support naval, air force and expeditionary land forces. The importance of the facility was underscored very recently on October 17, 2024, when the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced airstrikes in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen by U.S. Air Force B-2 bombers. The B2 Spirit long-range stealth bombers, based in the Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri in United States have known to use the military base at Diego Garcia in the past as “pit stops” for refueling etc. on long range missions in Asia.
China In The Indian Ocean
The developments concerning Chagos would be keenly watched in Beijing, where military aspirations concerning the Indian Ocean are an area of active and continuous attention. Beijing, pursuing its “two oceans” strategy, has been on a lookout for long-term military support arrangements in the Indian Ocean region. It has cultivated close political ties with the island nations of Maldives, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros, with the hope of securing a military foothold for its growing naval aspirations.
The military-level engagement between China and these island states has also seen a steady rise. With the exception of the “logistics base” that it has developed at Djibouti in the Horn of Africa region, China is yet to secure a dedicated military facility in the Indian Ocean. However, its pursuit of “dual use” projects continues.
In April 2024, a Chinese company was awarded a contract by the Maldivian government to expand the domestic airport at Kadhdhoo in the Laamu Atoll in south Maldives to an international airport. A separate contract was awarded to the same company to develop a Maritime Hub nearby comprising a cruise terminal and super yacht marina, to provide off-shore bunkering services, and establish an eco-resort.
Analysts point out to the ongoing financial difficulties of Maldives, questioning whether the high capital expenditure on such a major infrastructure project is realistic and sustainable or could lead to a situation similar to the case of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka which had to be leased by the Lankan government to a Chinese company for 99 years in a debt-to-equity swap. Exclusively owned, operated and managed Chinese ports and airports in the region open up the possibilities of dual-use of various services for military purposes.
Goes Beyond Fishing
Chinese deep-water fishing vessels are known to operate extensively in the Indian Ocean, especially in the Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, falling outside Exclusive Economic Zones of littoral states. It is possible that China could deploy its fishing vessels, known to be commonly crewed by the “maritime militia”, for surveillance and information gathering activities around the Chagos Islands.
Chinese and other extra-regional fishing vessels are known to commonly operate in the waters surrounding Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and East Africa, sometimes legitimately (licenced fishing) and on numerous occasions illegitimately, too indulging in Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Further, industrial fishing by Chinese or other fishing vessels in Chagos waters could pose challenges for the Maritime Protection Area that is sought to be established by Mauritius under the agreement with UK.
How France & Australia See It
France and Australia are two other Indian Ocean powers, apart from India, for whom the Chagos related developments would be of great interest. France possesses numerous territories in the Southern Indian Ocean, including a significant military presence headquartered at La Reunion near Mauritius. For all practical purposes, France is an Indian Ocean power, also reflected in its membership of the Indian Ocean Commission (which it chaperones), Indian Ocean Rim Association and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.
France shares the wariness of U.S., India and Australia about the growing Chinese naval ingress in the Indian Ocean, and Beijing’s close relations with island states like Madagascar and Comoros that have been former French colonies, and still retain close ties with Paris. Comoros disputes the French territory of Mayotte as a part of its own archipelago, and this factor may serve to Beijing’s advantage.
Notably, in the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Chinese President Xi Jinping and Comorian President Azali Assoumani announced the elevation of their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership. The likelihood of a greater role for U.S. and UK in Mauritian security affairs after regaining sovereignty over Chagos may not be a welcome proposition for France, which has traditionally maintained close ties with Port Louis. Intensification of security engagement with UK in France’s traditional area of influence in the Indian Ocean may not be comfortable to Paris. Australia, a staunch U.S. and UK ally, would look forward to the continued operation of Diego Garcia to serve the broader objectives of the AUKUS alliance.
Australia has plans of developing military aviation facilities at its Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean, which falls roughly midway between Australia’s northwest coast and Diego Garcia.
India’s Interests
India enjoys a close relationship with Mauritius, built over strong political, cultural and economic ties. India has also assisted Mauritius in strengthening its security preparedness, especially in maritime security. Mauritius does not maintain a formal military, and has police and paramilitary forces performing security roles.
The UK-Mauritius joint statement of October 3, 2024, acknowledged the support and assistance of India in reaching the political agreement. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs, in response to the development, noted that “India remains committed with Mauritius and other like-minded partners in strengthening maritime safety and security and contributing to enhanced peace and prosperity in the Indian Ocean region”.
India’s primary concern would be to ensure that Chagos archipelago, which is about 1700 kilometres from its southern tip, is kept free from encroachment of extra-regional actors inimical to its interests. To that end, in future, India could possibly offer to cooperate with U.S. and UK towards helping Mauritius in management of the security of the archipelago. India and Mauritius have been in collaboration to develop enhanced operational facilities on the Agalega islands of Mauritius for improvement of connectivity. Building upon this background, Mauritius may choose to seek India’s assistance in establishing connectivity with the Chagos archipelago.
Likewise, towards enhancing long range surveillance by maritime patrol aircraft, utilisation of the facilities at Diego Garcia could be of interest to regional partners. Closer military cooperation between U.S., Australia, India and Japan has been reinforced with the 28th edition of Malabar naval exercise recently hosted by India in the Bay of Bengal. In recent years, the La Perouse multilateral naval exercise mooted by France in the Indian Ocean has witnessed the participation of the navies of India, France, UK, U.S., Japan and Australia.
Assomption Island
Lastly, recent developments concerning the tiny Assomption Island, in the Aldabra group of Seychelles must be noted. Back in 2015, during the term of President Danny Faure of Seychelles, India and Seychelles had concluded an agreement to jointly develop facilities on Assomption Island to be used by both countries. The proposed project was aimed at helping Seychelles’ Coast Guard to patrol the vast EEZ against threats of piracy, illegal fishing and drug-trafficking, which is on the rise.
However, the project could not move forward because the agreement was not ratified in the Seychelles parliament. The main resistance came from the opposition party, Linyon Demokratik Seselwa (LDS) led by Wavel Ramkalawan, who later became the President in October 2020. President Ramkalawan’s government has now declared their intention of signing an agreement with a Qatari infrastructure company to create an upmarket resort on Assomption, and construction is already finished on the expansion of the airstrip on the island that would allow bigger aircraft to land.
Conservationists and botanists have expressed concerns over the Seychelles government plans for the Qatari-funded upscale resort on Assomption Island.
Interestingly, the Aldabra group of islands was a part of BIOT from 1965 to 1976, before it was separated by UK, together with Farquhar and Desroches islands and transferred to Seychelles on latter’s independence.
The impending transfer of sovereignty of Chagos to Mauritius would mark an epoch in the decolonisation of the Indian Ocean, while giving rise to new hopes and fears over the strategic power plays in the region, anchored in the evolving geopolitical alignments of the twenty first century.
