Part 1 of a 2-part series
For more than a decade, India’s Bangladesh policy rested on one central assumption.
As long as Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League remained dominant in Dhaka, India’s eastern security environment would remain broadly stable.
That framework is now weakening.
The rise of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the resurgence of Jamaat-e-Islami, the return of Pakistan-Bangladesh military engagement, expanding Chinese influence, and growing American strategic interest in Bangladesh are collectively reshaping the region.
India is no longer dealing with a neighbour primarily aligned around shared political understandings. It is dealing with a Bangladesh that is actively diversifying its external relationships and reducing dependence on New Delhi.
This is a significant structural shift.
The old India-Bangladesh relationship was built partly on history. India supported Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971. Sheikh Hasina cooperated closely with New Delhi on security issues. India and Bangladesh improved connectivity, trade, energy integration, and counter-insurgency coordination.
That period produced tangible benefits for India.
Several insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast lost sanctuary networks inside Bangladesh. Cross-border cooperation improved substantially. Connectivity between mainland India and the Northeast expanded. Bangladesh also became an important transit and energy partner for India.
But the relationship also became overly dependent on political continuity inside Bangladesh.
India invested heavily in ties with the Awami League leadership while underestimating the degree of resentment building within sections of Bangladeshi politics and society. Many in Bangladesh increasingly viewed India as overly dominant, dismissive of Bangladeshi concerns, and excessively invested in one political faction.
That perception matters because anti-India politics has long existed inside Bangladesh, especially within BNP and Jamaat circles.
Those forces have now returned with greater political relevance.
Dhaka’s Strategic Logic
India often interprets Bangladesh’s growing engagement with China and Pakistan as evidence of hostility. That interpretation is too simplistic.
Bangladesh’s actions follow a familiar pattern seen across smaller states located beside powerful neighbours. Such states usually seek multiple external partners in order to avoid excessive dependence on any one country.
Dhaka’s outreach to China serves several purposes.
First, China provides financing and infrastructure at a scale India cannot easily match. Chinese investments in ports, transport links, industrial projects, and river management offer Bangladesh economic and strategic alternatives.
Second, Chinese involvement gives Bangladesh leverage against India during disputes over water sharing, trade access, and border issues.
Third, engagement with China signals that Bangladesh does not accept an India-centric regional order.
This does not automatically mean Bangladesh wants to become a Chinese satellite. In fact, Dhaka appears to be trying to avoid overdependence on any major power.
The American Angle
That is why Bangladesh is simultaneously expanding contacts with the United States.
Reports suggest Dhaka and Washington are discussing major defence agreements, including GSOMIA and ACSA, that could provide American military platforms logistical access to Bangladeshi ports and airfields. Strategic facilities such as Chittagong and Matarbari reportedly feature in these discussions.
If finalised, the agreements would allow US warships and military aircraft to use Bangladeshi facilities for refuelling, maintenance, and logistics support while also expanding intelligence cooperation.
This is a major development. For decades, Bangladesh carefully avoided becoming too closely associated with any external military alignment. The possibility of regular American military access changes the strategic profile of the Bay of Bengal.
China will see this as part of a wider American effort to constrain Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific.
India’s response is likely to be more complicated.
Why Delhi Is Uneasy
India’s relationship with the United States has deepened considerably over the past two decades. New Delhi increasingly cooperates with Washington on maritime security, Indo-Pacific strategy, and balancing China.
Yet India has traditionally opposed major external military footprints inside South Asia. This creates an awkward contradiction.
India does not want Chinese strategic penetration into Bangladesh. But it is also unlikely to feel entirely comfortable if Bangladesh becomes an operational hub for sustained American military access in the Bay of Bengal.
New Delhi’s core preference has always been strategic insulation in its immediate neighbourhood.
India is particularly sensitive to developments in Bangladesh because of geography. Bangladesh borders much of India’s Northeast and sits close to the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow land link connecting the Northeast to mainland India.
Any major foreign military presence or dual-use infrastructure near these areas immediately acquires strategic significance.
This is why India is reacting strongly to Chinese-backed projects near the Teesta basin, expanding port infrastructure in Bangladesh, and renewed Pakistan-Bangladesh military contacts.
The concern is not necessarily imminent conflict. The concern is long-term strategic conditioning.
Ports constructed for commercial use can eventually support naval operations. Intelligence-sharing agreements can reshape regional security dynamics. Infrastructure financed by external powers can acquire military utility during crises.
Indian planners view these developments cumulatively rather than individually.
Enter The Dragon
China’s role in Bangladesh is now impossible to separate from wider competition in the Indian Ocean.
Beijing sees Bangladesh as strategically valuable for several reasons.
Bangladesh sits near key maritime routes in the Bay of Bengal. It offers proximity to India’s eastern coastline. It also connects to Chinese interests in Myanmar and broader Belt and Road Initiative networks.
Chinese financing of infrastructure projects in Bangladesh has steadily expanded over the past decade. Ports, roads, industrial parks, river projects, and energy infrastructure all increase Beijing’s long-term influence.
India is especially concerned about projects near the Siliguri Corridor and the Teesta basin.
The Teesta issue illustrates India’s broader diplomatic problem.
For years, India failed to conclude a water-sharing agreement with Bangladesh because of internal political disagreements involving West Bengal. China exploited this vacuum by offering financial and technical support for river management projects.
This pattern has repeated elsewhere in South Asia. India often assumes geographic centrality automatically guarantees influence. China, meanwhile, moves faster with financing and project execution. That does not mean Chinese projects are always economically sound or politically popular. But speed matters in diplomacy.
Bangladesh has learnt how to use Chinese interest to pressure India.
Pakistan’s Return
Pakistan’s growing engagement with Bangladesh carries greater strategic symbolism than economic value.
Islamabad cannot compete with China financially or with India geographically. But Pakistan still retains relevance through military contacts, intelligence networks, and ideological links with anti-India political forces inside Bangladesh.
Reports of renewed ISI engagement with Dhaka have therefore generated serious concern in New Delhi.
For India, the fear is not conventional warfare. The larger concern is the revival of cross-border destabilisation.
Indian security agencies remember earlier periods when insurgent organisations in the Northeast operated from Bangladeshi territory. The Awami League government dismantled many of those networks. India now worries that a more Pakistan-friendly political environment in Dhaka could gradually weaken those gains.
Jamaat-e-Islami’s resurgence intensifies these concerns.
The party historically opposed Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 and maintained close ideological and operational links with Pakistan. Its growing strength in border-adjacent regions has alarmed Indian security planners.
India worries that these areas could again become vulnerable to extremist networks, smuggling routes, and insurgent activity.
Whether those fears are entirely justified is debatable. Bangladesh today has stronger state institutions and greater economic stability than it did during the 1990s or early 2000s.
But strategic mistrust is clearly increasing.
