The Strait of Hormuz debate playing out live has also brought renewed attention to Greater Nicobar Island (GNI), India’s southernmost tip, and the proposed transshipment port at Galathea Bay.
Much of the commentary centres on GNI’s strategic importance on one hand, and environmental and commercial viability concerns on the other.
The military logic is, to some extent, self-evident—especially at a time when maritime chokepoints have become a matter of public interest following US-Iran tensions over the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime chokepoints provide significant leverage, particularly when trade disruption is possible, and they offer distinct advantages to the defender.
GNI, lying astride the Six Degree Channel—the primary trade route exiting the Malacca Strait and at the western edge of its northern funnel, through which much of China’s seaborne trade passes—is a veritable crow’s nest, offering the widest possible field of view over this critical waterway.
The idea of a transshipment hub (TSH) at GNI is closely linked to, and evolved as, a counterpoint to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). First articulated by President Xi Jinping soon after coming to power in 2013, the BRI sought to promote regional and global trade and stimulate economic growth by leveraging historical trade routes and connectivity.
Its underlying rationale, however, has been both mercantilist and strategic—expanding Chinese influence through a cooperative framework that appears non-threatening, yet often results in dual-use facilities, enabled by opaque financing and unsustainable debt. China sought to allay such concerns by invoking the romance of historical trade routes through the idea of a Maritime Silk Route and similar constructs.
In India, it was recognised early that the BRI effectively operationalised the earlier “string of pearls” concept, and for a long time India stood largely alone in opposing it. On land, this opposition centred on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through territory that India considers its own and thus raises sovereignty concerns. At sea, however, sovereignty arguments are less tenable, making it necessary to develop a more sustainable and pragmatic response.
By 2014, the “string of pearls” in India’s vicinity included Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, and projects in the Maldives such as the I-Havan development, which included a transshipment port at Gaadhoo Island. While Gwadar lacked commercial viability and was largely strategic, the others had clear economic rationale.
In response, India launched Project Mausam in 2014, led by the Ministry of Culture, to re-establish maritime, cultural, and historical linkages across the Indian Ocean and revive ancient maritime traditions. The voyage of INSV Kaundinya from India to Oman in January 2026 was conceived under this initiative. However, while Project Mausam sought to revive historical linkages, it was clearly insufficient as a counter to BRI. A more hard-nosed, economically grounded approach became necessary.
It therefore made both strategic and economic sense to develop alternatives to foreign transshipment terminals—existing and planned—that funnel cargo to Indian ports. In this context, Vizhinjam in Kerala, located close to major international shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf and Red Sea towards the Malacca Strait, emerged as an ideal site for a transshipment port on India’s western coast. Though formally conceived in 1991, the project languished for years until renewed impetus following BRI led to construction beginning in December 2015.
Despite protests over environmental and livelihood concerns, the port was commissioned in December 2024 as India’s first deep-water transshipment hub. It has since surpassed the one million TEU mark within a year and is now drawing transshipment business from Colombo, Singapore, and Dubai—possibly aided by the Hormuz crisis.
Editor’s Note: Watch an exclusive, extensive StratNews Global documentary series filmed in the Andaman & Nicobar Command.
On the eastern seaboard, peninsular India does not offer similar proximity to key shipping lanes. This makes GNI, in the Andaman and Nicobar chain, an ideal location for a transshipment hub to service ports across the Bay of Bengal rim. Like Vizhinjam, it offers adequate depth and proximity to major shipping routes emerging from the Malacca Strait.
A conceptual map of a hub at GNI with radial routes to Bay of Bengal ports clearly highlights its location advantage. However, as a greenfield project, success will depend on building all critical infrastructure—airports, ancillary industry, power, water, and most importantly, efficient coastal shipping networks to distribute cargo.
Geographically, GNI has significant advantages. Larger in area than Singapore, it lies barely 50 km north of the international shipping lane through the Six Degree Channel. Its natural depth allows it to host ultra-large container vessels that currently bypass Indian ports due to depth constraints. In that sense, it possesses all the attributes required for a successful transshipment hub.
Even as Vizhinjam and GNI represent India’s response to BRI, a broader framework has been taking shape in the form of the India-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEEC). One of its key aims is to bypass chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal while enhancing trade connectivity. The transshipment hubs at Vizhinjam and GNI fit neatly into this vision, acting as consolidation points feeding into multimodal ship-road-rail networks that offer diversified trade routes.
The timeline of these developments is instructive: BRI articulated in 2013; Project Mausam launched in 2014; renewed impetus to Vizhinjam in 2014–15, with construction beginning in December 2015; GNI receiving environmental clearance in 2022, with Phase 1 targeted for commissioning in 2028; and IMEEC announced in 2023, with a 2030 operational horizon.
The ongoing US-Iran conflict will undoubtedly influence these projects. Yet, taken together, Vizhinjam, GNI, and IMEEC present a coherent vision of trade and connectivity that could significantly reduce India’s dependence on foreign ports—a vulnerability clearly exposed by current geopolitical tensions. The Hormuz crisis may well act as a catalyst for accelerating these initiatives, even as China is unlikely to welcome developments that undercut the BRI.
The strategic rationale for the port at GNI extends beyond military considerations. It is rooted in geopolitics, geoeconomics, and the inevitable jostling within a shifting global order. What ultimately emerges remains uncertain, but it is imperative for India to seize the opportunities before it to better position itself in this transition.
Much as Stamford Raffles did when he established Singapore as a trading hub of the British Empire, the criticisms directed at GNI today may, in time, appear no different from those once levelled at transformative projects of the past.
