At the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, Leo Wigger of Berlin’s Candid Foundation offered a refreshingly blunt look at how Europe currently views South Asia: through the hard lens of interests, trade and stability — with India increasingly at the centre of that equation.
Bangladesh, he said, matters to Europe largely for economic reasons. From Brussels’ perspective, the country’s recent election represents a reasonably smooth transfer of power, but what matters most now is performance.
“Our main focus is to have good trade relations,” Wigger said, noting that the EU’s textile trade with Bangladesh remains significant. Politics matters, but commerce matters more.
Pakistan, by contrast, has steadily slipped down Europe’s list of priorities.
“For a long time, European interest in Pakistan was defined by the NATO mission in Afghanistan,” Wigger said. “Since the Taliban takeover in 2021, that interest has really decreased.”
The result is a striking detachment. Even as tensions rise between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Europe is largely watching from afar. “We don’t really have a stake in there,” he said flatly.
Instead, Europe’s strategic focus remains much closer to home. Russia and the war in Ukraine dominate European security thinking, while instability in West Asia raises concerns about trade routes, connectivity and the movement of people — all issues that could affect both India and Europe.
That is precisely where Wigger believes India and the EU could find deeper common ground.
For years, he acknowledged, India did not view the European Union as a serious geopolitical actor. The EU was often seen as bureaucratic, slow-moving and politically fragmented.
But that perception may now be changing.
Global disruptions — from wars to tariffs and supply chain shocks — are pushing New Delhi and Brussels toward closer cooperation. The recently concluded EU–India trade deal, once widely dismissed as unlikely, is a sign of that shift.
Where Europe has also begun to recalibrate is in its expectations of India’s foreign policy — particularly on Russia.
Early in the Ukraine war, many Europeans were frustrated that India refused to isolate Moscow. That frustration, Wigger suggested, has gradually been replaced by a more pragmatic understanding.
“If India has good reasons to trade with Russia, that’s India’s decision,” he said. “If we want to change that, we have to make a better offer.”
Looking ahead, Wigger believes the real strategic opportunity lies beyond bilateral trade.
Europe, India and the Gulf states all share stakes across the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and the South Caucasus. Yet structured dialogue among them remains minimal.
“There’s almost no political discourse between the EU, India and the GCC on regional dynamics,” he said. “That’s something we should change.”
If that triangular conversation takes shape, it could form the backbone of a new geopolitical partnership — one driven less by ideology and more by shared economic interests and stability in an increasingly unsettled world.
