In the second part of our series Disputed, we look at the Sikkim-Tibet border where the Chinese have raised the possibility of “early harvest”, meaning a quick resolution. The irony is there are no territorial claims being made here by either side and there is consensus on the alignment of the Line of Actual Control. But China has refused to discuss Sikkim’s borders so far. With Bhutan China has a dispute, over the Doklam Plateau which has implications for the Siliguri Corridor. This entire series is based on Defence Ministry records.
China’s apparent eagerness to finalise the Sino-Indian boundary in Sikkim stems from its desire to open up the route from Khamba Dzong on Tibet’s border with India, to Natu La in Sikkim,for trade.
It would also provide China access to the Bay of Bengal and prise open the markets of eastern India and Bangladesh. The Sikkim-Chumbi Valley (in Tibet) route is also the shortest as compared to the Yunnan-Myanmar CPEC Corridor. Opening up the trade route will be advantage China since it would not have to settle its boundary disputes in other sectors.
Former foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale had warned against any move to settle the Sikkim boundary in isolation since it could set off a chain of events that might compel Bhutan to open its borders to the Chinese.
Sikkim is important for many reasons, notably it borders the Chumbi Valley in Tibet, which is shaped like a dagger pointing at India.
Chumbi Valley
The Chumbi Valley in Tibet is of immense strategic importance to the PLA, since it can station troops there far from the harsh climate of the Tibetan Plateau. It can also threaten the Siliguri Corridor in India just over 50-km away.
But the valley is also narrow and China may seek to obviate that by expanding into the Doklam Bowl on Bhutan’s western border. The India-China standoff in Doklam in 2017 comes to mind.
Stability can only be achieved if both sides continue to retain their existing vunlerabilities since any military confrontation could inadvertently escalate. India therefore needs to strengthen its hold over the Dongkya watershed, a mountain range running from north Sikkim southwards connecting with the Chumbi Valley and ending at Mt. Gipmochi, where it forms a disputed tri-junction between India, Tibet and Bhutan.
Importance of Doklam, Duktengang
The route to the Siliguri Corridor lies via Duktengang through the Doklam gateway. Thus the strategic importance of Doklam and Duktengang to India, is greater than what it means for Bhutan and even China. The security of the area is closely linked to the Siliguri Corridor and it will require some astute diplomacy and military actions so that the character of the area does not change.
A word on the Doklam crisis of June 2017 would provide context here. China tried to build a road in the area towards Jampheri, thus unilaterally attempting to shift the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction from Batang La to Gyemochen.
It was a clear violation of two agreements, that of 1988 and 1998 which laid down no change in the status quo while boundary negotiations were on. It also violated the 2012 understanding between the special representatives of India and China that the tri-junction boundary can only be decided in consultation with Bhutan.
Bhutan had initially protested to the Chinese about their road-building but when they took no heed, Indian troops stepped in to stop their construction activities. It remains frozen to this day but China is consolidating in north Doklam, building tunnels in Merug La and Sinchel La Ridge enabling all weather connectivity for the PLA.
Helipads have been built, accommodation for troops has expanded significantly and in 2019, Tibetans from Yadong County were relocated to North Doklam in purpose built village settlements. The situation can improve only after Bhutan and China reach a boundary settlement.
Siliguri Corridor
Otherwise known as the Chicken’s Neck, the Siliguri Corridor runs 60-km north to south through the state of West Bengal connecting the northeastern states. It is 170-km wide bounded by Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan in the north and Bangladesh to the south. At its narrowest, it measures 20-km by 22-km between Nepal and Bangladesh.
The geography of the corridor is strategic: it comprises surface communication networks, power grids, oil pipelines, airports and so on, which makes it hugely vulnerable.
The conventional threat emanates from the PLA in the Chumbi Valley, that can also be manifested through Doklam, which is why the defence of this sector by the Royal Bhutanese Army is critical.
The area is rife with separatist groups: Bodos, Assamese, Kamtapuris, Rajbanshis and the Gorkhas of Darjeeling and Kalimpong besides of course Muslim fundamentalist organisations. The porous borders all around facilitate violent, anti-state activities.
The area is threatened by illegal immigration, illegal infiltration, drugs trafficking, arms smuggling and possible exploitation of old political fault lines. North Bengal has a history of association with the communists and the spread of the communist movement in Nepal poses security challenges to India.
China’s cultivation of Nepal and Bangladesh with offers of lavish infra projects challenges India’s influence. The development of aviation infra at Bhadrapur and Biratnagar by Chinese firms close to the India-Nepal border, is also of concern.
As for Bangladesh, three salients protrude into the Siliguri Corridor of which one of them, Titalia is of particular concern given its military geography. The Indian government is building alternative connectivity to the northeastern states and some under construction expressways into Bhutan can lead to that.
The West Bengal government is responsible for the security of the corridor during normal times with Central Armed Police Forces providing armed and other back-up. During conflict, the army is responsible for rear area security.
There is a need for multi-agency coordination both during peace time and conflict and although the army is doing this at the local level, an institutionalised mechanism is the need of the hour.
Its important to understand that along the entire Sino-Indian border, the risk of unintended escalation is highest in this area. The irony bears re-stating: there is no dispute between India and China here, the boundary dispute lies in a third country Bhutan, which makes things very tricky.
The army has to plan for the worst and hope for the best. Any effective military response to Chinese belligerence will be mounted from Sikkim and the border districts of West Bengal namely Kalimpong and Jalpaiguri. This is the importance of the hill districts of Bengal and the Siliguri Corridor.
Thirty eight years in journalism, widely travelled, history buff with a preference for Old Monk Rum. Current interest/focus spans China, Technology and Trade. Recent reads: Steven Colls Directorate S and Alexander Frater's Chasing the Monsoon. Netflix/Prime video junkie. Loves animal videos on Facebook. Reluctant tweeter.
