Decoding the Indian and Chinese readouts issued at the end of the talks between the Special Representatives. Note that this is the first meeting of the SRs after a gap of nearly five years following the Galwan clash.
What India Wants
The Indian readout issued by the Ministry of External Affairs is concise, matter of fact. Paras 2 and 3 broadly sum up what the MEA seeks from the China relationship:
To “oversee the management of peace and tranquility in the border areas, to explore a fair reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question and maintain a political perspective of overall bilateral ties.”
Para 5 calls for “effective border management” with the SRs guiding the diplomatic and military mechanisms for the purpose. How this will happen is not clear given the manner in which China has gone about tearing up agreements signed since the 1990s.
Para 6 refers to resumption of the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, data-sharing on trans-border rivers (Brahmaputra) and border trade.
The yatra has not been held since the Covid outbreak and thereafter China did not renew the arrangements for pilgrims to cross over into Tibet. As for data sharing on the Brahmaputra, nothing has been forthcoming since 2017 (which also coincides with the standoff over Doklam in Bhutan).
Border trade through Nathu-La in Sikkim suffered halts following Covid. Traders on both sides have been seeking expansion of the limited goods being allowed for trade at this point.
Some Conclusions
Decoding all this, the Indian readout addressed the concerns of a largely Indian audience which sees China as the Public Enemy No 1. The public needed to be reassured that the government has a handle on the China relationship, that it has a strategy and a plan.
Yes, the details of how this plan will work out on the ground are yet to be decided upon. But this is only the first meeting of the SRs and there was a need to reiterate some old points and make some new ones.
Trust or the lack of it, remains a huge issue. China’s persistent undermining of bilateral agreements (even international ones like UNCLOS), its use of trade as a strategic weapon (India’s deficit with China has crossed $100 billion), and undermining India’s periphery, are policies that are unlikely to change.
But the dialogue has to be kept going to ensure issues of concern to India are always being brought to Beijing’s attention. That’s what diplomacy is all about.
What China Wants
China’s readout underscored a point it has made time and again: that the border issue should be kept aside for future generations. Here’s what it said:
“…the border issue should be properly handled from the overall situation of bilateral relations so as not to affect the overall development of bilateral relations.”
Decoding this, the focus should be on enhancing ties in other areas ranging from the political and economic to culture, tourism, people to people and so on. But India places the border dispute at the front and centre of the relationship and is clear that without resolution, ties will continue to be characterised by distrust.
There is a degree of opacity when the readout refers to “refine the management and control rules in the border areas, strengthen the building of confidence-building-measures and achieve sustainable peace and tranquillity on the border.”
There have been reports that the Chinese in Depsang, are insisting on “escorted patrols”, meaning their border personnel will accompany Indian patrols moving to our claimed areas.
If that is the case, India should insist that we do the same with Chinese personnel patrolling up to their claimed point in Burtse. The Chinese are also demanding they be allowed into Yangtse in Arunachal Pradesh.
More Conclusions
If this is what the Chinese define as confidence building measures, India needs a deep rethink. Also interesting to note that neither readout made any reference to de-escalation and de-induction of troops along the Line of Actual Control.
The Chinese readout was broadcast by its state-run media including Global Times. Much play was given to Doval calling on Vice-President Han Zheng, a relative non-entity. China’s ambassador to India Xu Feihong did the same on his X handle (over 100,000 followers) and there’s no doubt the media reach is impressive.
Decoding again: Beijing’s deal with India may have been done with a eye on US strategic pressure under president-elect Trump. The intention may have been to do the minimum necessary to keep the Indian flank quiet and stretch out the negotiations (Chinese torture?) with incremental concessions. Let’s see how this plays out.
