Recent events suggest worrying trends highlighting that Beijing is preparing for a forceful reunification with Taiwan, writes China scholar Suyash Desai in an analysis in the journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
The analysis titled Forceful Taiwan Reunification: China’s Targeted Military And Civilian-Military Measures, warns that reunification has been part of Xi Jinping’s China Dream since the 2017 Communist Party Congress.
Desai quotes from political scientist Ketian Zhang’s book China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion, that annexing Taiwan is considered a core interest of China, with official references to its significance appearing regularly since 2003.
Also recall Xi Jinping’s address last December where he declared “No one can stop the historical trend of reunification of the motherland.”
“Since 2015,” Desai writes, “the PRC has undertaken significant organisational, legal and structural reforms to enhance the National Defence Mobilization System (NDMS)”, which enables the PRC to harness its political, economic, technological, cultural, social and other resources from peacetime to war time.
He quotes China scholar Devin Thorne’s recent testimony to the US-China Economic & Security Review Commission, where he cited the enactment of the National Defense Transportation Law 2017, the introduction of updated auditing and surveying data on natural resources protocols in 2018 and 2021, the creation of a new type of highly trained and professional local militia force since 2021, and the enhancement of cross-militia training initiatives starting in 2024.
“The PLA can mobilize private and civilian resources through the NDMS during national emergencies,” writes Desai, “…. once operational the NDMS would ultimately allow the PRC to mobilise society and harness civilian and mililtary resources more systematically and institutionally in case of a potential forceful reunification attempt with Taiwan.”
Can China do it? Some scholars dismiss the idea that the PLA remains incapable of conducting amphibious operations at the scale needed to take control of Taiwan, which has 169,000 active military personnel and 1.66 million reservists.
Using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, the PLA would need to mobilize at least 507,000 soldiers. To cross the 106-km wide Taiwan Strait, China would need thousands of ships far beyond the current capabilities of its 234 warships.
However, Desai points out that China has emphasised the construction of Ro-Ro ships, which can use their power to set up ramps on docks or beaches to transport vehicles. Each Ro-Ro vessel can carry an estimated 300 vehicles and 1500 passengers.
The PLA has in fact prioritized the construction of Ro-Ro vessels and according to naval strategist Michael Dahm, China has 31 Ro-Ro ferries in operation. However, the Centre for Strategic & International Studies pointed out that mainland shipyards would deliver up to 400 Ro-Ro vessels from 2023-26.
China is also known to be building at least five landing barges at the Guangzhou shipyard with unusually long road bridges that extend from the bow of the ship, which makes them relevant to amphibious landing operations.
Although these are vulnerable to attacks by Taiwanese F-16s, warships and submarines, they would be supported by the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force and PLA Rocket Force.
For the full text of the analysis: https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/forceful-taiwan-reunification-chinas-targeted-military-and-civilian-military-measures/
