Covert assistance to Pakistan by China to further its nuclear and missiles programme continues unabated in violation of Beijing’s international commitments.
In the past four years alone, Indian intelligence and law-enforcement agencies have interdicted or tracked at least half a dozen consignments of dual-use items procured by Chinese entities from Europe and the United States for supply to Pakistan.
It’s Not Just Equipment
China’s assistance to Pakistan comes not only in the form of sourcing equipment but also providing technology and services, an analysis by Indian and friendly intelligence agencies has concluded.
Despite combined efforts of different countries to intercept or seize consignments or put sanctions on several state entities and shell companies, China and Pakistan keep finding alternative means via shell companies in third world countries to facilitate clandestine proliferation activities.
Serial Offenders
As the instances cited below will prove, seizures of sensitive/dual-use cargo have increased at Indian ports in the recent past. This has both Pakistan and China concerned about their proliferation activities coming to the fore.
Some of the recent seizures in India point towards the unrelenting efforts by Beijing and Islamabad to circumvent the bans and sanctions for proliferation.
New Year, Same Old Story
The latest example came in January this year when a consignment of CNC machinery, made by an Italian firm GKD CNC Technology, was seized by the Indian Customs officials at Nhava Sheva Port, Mumbai on January 23, while it was being diverted to Pakistan through China.
The consignment was shipped by Shanghai JXE Global Logistics Co Ltd, China and the consignee was named Pakistan Wings Pvt Ltd, Sialkot.
This container with CNC machinery was loaded at Shekou Port in China on a merchant vessel CMA CGM Attila on January 9 and was bound for Karachi Port. However, the vessel reached Nhava Sheva Port in Mumbai on January 22, 2024 during its voyage to Karachi.
Fake Recipient
On closer scrutiny, Indian authorities discovered that Cosmos Engineering, a Pakistani defence supplier, was listed as the original recipient of the shipment whereas M/s Taiyuan Mining Import and Export Co Ltd. of China was the original shipper.
On further investigation, it was found that Pakistan Wings Pvt Ltd has been involved in facilitating the shipment of dual-use and restricted items from various destinations like China, Italy and Turkey to Pakistani defence entities.
In order to avoid detection by international agencies, Pakistan Wings would mask the original consignee such as Cosmos Engineering. Pakistan Wings is also known to have close ties with M/s Quantum Logix, a shell company of National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) and a sanctioned entity by the U.S. for supporting Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme.
In March 2022, at the same Nhava Sheva port, Indian authorities interdicted a consignment of thermo-electric instruments sourced from an Italian company, M/s Distek Strumenti & Misure S.r.I. (DSM) by Cosmos Engineering meant for AQ Khan Research Laboratory. Following this seizure, Cosmos Engineering was put on the international watch-list.
Aiding Pak’s WMD Programme
In another incident in May 2023, a shipment of Jacketed Glass Reactor (circulates oil or water to regulate temperature) and other key laboratory equipment from China, destined for Pakistan’s WMD programme, was seized by Indian customs at Nhava Sheva Port. A Malta-flagged vessel, CMA CGM Figaro, was carrying this equipment in a container from Qingdao Port to Karachi. During its voyage, the vessel reached Nhava Sheva Port, where Indian Customs offloaded the consignment.
Available shipping details indicated World Panda Logistics Co Ltd as the shipper whereas, the equipment was manufactured by M/s Biobase International Co. Ltd, located at Jinan in Shandong Province of China. The recipient was listed as Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd, a Rawalpindi-based shell company of Pakistan’s Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO), and a sanctioned entity by the BIS of United States Commerce Department for its involvement in Pakistan’s WMD programme.
Supplier Sanctioned By U.S.
This is not all. According to customs data, an autoclave (used to sterilise pressure vessels) supplied by M/s General Technology Ltd, a Chinese supplier sanctioned by the U.S., was seized at Kandla Port in Gujarat by Indian authorities in February 2020.
The autoclave was seized from a Hong Kong-flagged Chinese ship named Dai Cui Yun. It was shipped from Jiangyin Port in Jiangsu Province of China and bound for Pakistan’s Port Qasim. The equipment was hidden at the bottom of the ship’s concealed compartment.
After detailed inspection of the detained consignment, it was observed that the equipment was falsely declared as “Industrial Dryers” and was meant for National Development Complex (NDC), a Pakistani state entity involved in the development of long-range ballistic missiles.
Material For Chemical Warfare
In January 2022, a consignment of critical electrical/automation components and other relevant machinery destined for Pakistan’s DESTO was seized at Mumbai’s Nhava Sheva Port. A container vessel, ‘Kota Megah’, sailing under Singapore flag had shipped the consignment weighing 80,390 kg in four containers from Shanghai Port in mid-December 2021.
The vessel, on its voyage to Karachi, reached Nhava Sheva on January 08, 2022. Subsequently, Indian authorities offloaded four containers. The relevant papers listed M/s Suzhou Kanjia Clean Technology Ltd as the shipper. Pakistan’s DESTO HQ, located at Site-3, Opposite Chattar Park, Rawalpindi was to receive the consignment.
After due examination by relevant domain experts, it was found that the high-end equipment was meant for use in a facility that functions in a highly corrosive environment and was likely to be used for producing/manufacturing chemical warfare/nuclear warfare material.
The recent pattern of proliferation can be traced back to July 2021, when a consignment of two cryogenic oxygen storage tanks, meant for Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), was shipped from Ningbo Seaport through a carrier vessel ‘Felixstowe Bridge’ and was destined to Karachi.
It was intercepted at Nhava Sheva Port (Mumbai) on July 25, 2021. As per the shipping details, the cryogenic tanks were shipped by M/s Hangzhou Chengyingyi Energy Technology Co. Ltd. M/s Ghani Global Holdings, a Lahore-based Pakistani defence supplier, was the consignee.
Indian authorities seized the tanks as they are prohibited under the Wassenaar Arrangement and SCOMET or India’s Export Control List and had potential defence applications, particularly in the ballistic missile development programme.
Following increased vigil and effective intelligence operations by Indian authorities, both China and Pakistan are now regularly camouflaging the consignee/consigner details during the shipment of such sensitive cargo.
‘Avoid Indian Ports’
According to a recent assessment, Pakistan has asked Chinese shippers to use “Direct Shipment Route” without touching Indian ports, for the movement of sensitive cargo and authorities are ready to pay three-four times of normal shipment cost. An analysis of shipping traffic in the past year reveals that dozens of merchant vessels were sailing every month between Chinese ports and Karachi without calling at any Indian port.
In addition, both China and Pakistan are also exploring alternative means for transporting sensitive/dual-use material/equipment from various parts of China to Pakistan. Pakistan’s defence/strategic entities find road transportation as one of the safest modes of transport for sensitive/defence procurements. Pakistani entities are now willing to spend higher amounts in using the land-route (China Mainland Kashgar Dry Port-Karakoram Highway-Sost Dry Port-Islamabad) which can cost at least four times more than the shipping routes.
