On Thursday, a Turkish Defence Ministry official in Istanbul made a cryptic announcement: Turkey and Israel had held what he described as “technical talks … to establish a de-escalation mechanism to prevent undesirable incidents in Syria.”
The talks were held in Azerbaijan, he said, “and work will continue to establish the conflict-free mechanism.”
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office confirmed that both sides had “agreed to continue on the path of dialogue in order to preserve security stability.”
It appeared to be the first engagement between two former regional partners with Turkey’s foreign minister offering a caveat: technical talks were solely to avoid conflict in Syria and was not about normalising relations. But what of Turkey’s reported plans to deploy air defence missiles on some Syrian airbases to deter Israeli airstrikes?
At a discussion in Delhi on the situation in Syria, Atul Aneja, former West Asia correspondent of The Hindu, ruled out any conflict between Turkey and Israel.
“I think it will be okay for Israel to have a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government (in Damascus) so long as it is not armed with missiles or any other such weaponry which can cause a security problem for Israel. This is similar to the Russia-Ukraine situation. Israel is okay with Turkey as far as it doesn’t cross the red line.”
But it’s never that simple. Until recently, Israel was aggressively lobbying the Trump administration to allow Russia to keep its bases in Syria (Khmeimim air base in Latakia and Tartus naval base 60 km south), rather than have the Turks move in.
Aneja suspects that Israel’s lobbying underscores “an ideologically different Israel. They are far more radical in their thinking, and their imagination goes to messianic levels. They are looking at a greater Israel picture with the central ideological basis that whatever they do has to bring in the redemption of the Jews. That’s the ultimate grand objective.”
Israel’s brutal war in Gaza against Hamas and the ruthless elimination of top Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon confirms this point.
“Driving out Hezbollah strongholds and killing of Hassan Nasrallah was a pivotal moment. As Hezbollah got killed, the Redwan Brigade, which was guarding Syria and Bashar al-Assad, got incapacitated,” says Aneja, noting that Israel’s war hit Iran grievously.
Israel’s air campaign in Lebanon made it largely impossible for Iran to transfer any weapons to Hezbollah, forcing it to reach a ceasefire. Hezbollah also accepted a de-linking of Gaza and Lebanese territory, weakening the unity of the front that Iran had hoped would ensure the survival of Hamas.
Today, Iran appears in the eye of the storm with Donald Trump threatening war if talks on its nuclear weapons programme do not succeed. The talks open in Oman on Saturday and according to various reports, could go on for two months. If they fail, Trump says Israel will take the lead in bombing Iran.
Where does that leave Turkey? Dr Mudassir Quamar, Associate Professor, Centre for West Asian Studies, argues that “Without working with countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel, Turkey will not be able to create a stable Syria. You can no longer exclude Israel from regional geopolitics. Israel is here to stay because it has the military power and backing of the most important superpower in the world.”
For now, the deck seems to favour Israel. But the shifting sands of West Asian geopolitics are never easy to read and even more difficult to predict.
