Anti-Japanese sentiment in China has risen sharply in recent weeks, though analysts note the surge aligns with a broader upward trend that began in 2023. The latest spike followed remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who said a Chinese attack on Taiwan could be considered a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, potentially triggering Japanese military involvement. Chinese authorities issued a series of countermeasures, including travel and study-abroad warnings, flight cancellations, a halt on Japanese seafood imports, and the withdrawal of permissions for Japanese artists’ performances.
Japan’s recent tightening of laws affecting foreign visitors and residents has also drawn scrutiny in China. Both Takaichi and Kimi Onoda, the minister responsible for policies on coexistence with foreign nationals, have repeatedly highlighted crimes committed by foreigners—messaging that has been closely watched by Chinese audiences.
Long-term patterns in official rhetoric were underscored in a study published in October by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI). The analysis of People’s Daily content from 1950 to 2019 found that negativity toward Japan peaked in 2013, coinciding with heightened tensions over the Senkaku Islands, known in China as the Diaoyu Islands.
Public opinion trends show even sharper swings. Annual surveys by Japan’s Genron NPO identify three major spikes in negative Chinese sentiment since 2005: in 2009, in 2013—when negative views reached a record 92.8 per cent—and again between 2023 and 2024, when negative perceptions climbed from 62.6 to 87.7 per cent.
These shifts also appear in cultural expressions. The slang term “little Japanese,” while not universal, has circulated on Chinese social media during periods of heightened nationalism, reflecting the emotional dimensions of public attitudes.
Historically, China–Japan relations have moved between cooperation and confrontation. Although ties improved after the 1972 normalisation, the 2000s saw widening differences over national identity and historical memory. Former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, China’s patriotic education campaigns, and recurring territorial disputes deepened mistrust on both sides.
The current rise in negative sentiment fits this longer trajectory. While reactions to Takaichi’s comments are significant, they remain less intense than the public outbursts recorded in 2013. Analysts say the outlook for China–Japan relations now hinges on whether Beijing pursues further punitive steps and how Tokyo advances Takaichi’s national security agenda, increased defence spending, and tightened immigration policies under the ruling coalition.
