A dizzying mix of actors have been at each other’s throats in Syria – state and nonstate, regional and international – each trying to achieve vastly different goals.
Almost all analyses over the last week have failed, thanks to the speed at which things have advanced. Any assessment last Monday was outdated by Wednesday, any assessment on Wednesday was outdated by Saturday and, with the fall of Damascus, any analysis on Saturday was irrelevant by Sunday.
It would thus be impossible for a snapshot essay to convey this complexity. However, what we can do is adopt a bird’s eye view, extrapolating five lessons and common-sense predictions from the chessboard at play.
Lesson 1
Assad neglected his State-driven military architecture. The Syrian army mostly relied on conscripts. It is no surprise that rebel groups took over some key cities without a fight, Syrian soldiers fleeing or surrendering immediately.
The ones who did the actual fighting for him were paramilitary groups like the National Defense Forces, aided by independent Shia groups from Iran and Lebanon. While they were highly effective during the last flare-up, they seem to have been thoroughly routed this time, lacking foreign support.
Moreover, many of the supporting militias from a decade ago have possibly moved elsewhere over the years, given things had somewhat cooled down after 2016-17.
Lesson 2
No ally can guarantee permanent security. The regime relied too much on Russia and Iran to retain its hold. Both parties are now occupied with their own military problems, thus unable to lend the same level of support.
Russia has undertaken airstrikes against advancing rebels, but such tactics are ineffective without ground troops to capitalize on those gains. The Wagner Group, once notoriously active (with operations like the Battle of Khasham) in Syria, no longer has a big presence after the Prigozhin coup.
Iran primarily used Hezbollah as its key weapon against Assad’s enemies, but the Hezbollah leadership was recently decimated by Israel, turning them irrelevant in the current equation.
Lesson 3
Divided enemies are not absent enemies. The Assad regime assumed the disparate rebel groups would never unite. This was logical, given that the rebels range from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF – Kurdish fighters backed by the USA who want a separate country with electoral democracy) to Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS – militant Islamists formerly known as al-Nusra Front and offshoots of, as some readers might have already guessed, al-Qaeda).
However, once HTS attacked and everybody realised just how weak the defenses were without international support, the rest took advantage and pounced as well, leading to multiple directions from which Assad was attacked, although none of the rebel groups actually like each other.
Lesson 4
Compromise with your neighbours. A crucial flaw in Assad’s diplomatic style was his lack of compromise. Turkey (which currently backs all the non-Kurdish rebel factions in the North, like the Syrian National Army) could have been won over with some concessions. It cannot afford to take in many more Syrian refugees, nor can it allow the Kurds to move towards autonomy.
Assad could have used this to mend ties with Ankara and move against mutual enemies like the Kurds. However, he blatantly refused Turkey’s request to accept the refugees back and worse, attacked Ankara backed rebel areas like Idlib to further exacerbate the refugee crisis into Turkey, angering Erdogan even more.
Lesson 5
Never underestimate geopolitical chain reactions. Although it is easy for ‘experts’ to claim in retrospect they saw this coming all along, the truth is most were taken by total surprise.
Two weeks ago, hardly any geopolitical observer prophesized the return of nationwide fighting. A week ago, virtually nobody predicted that by Sunday, Assad would flee the country and Damascus would fall so quickly.
Even fewer could have predicted that Ukraine wanting to join NATO or the October 7 attack on Israel, would spark a chain reaction eventually leading to Assad’s downfall. In some ways, it is a reminder of just how unpredictable geopolitics is, no less a force of nature than a tsunami or earthquake.
What does the future hold? There is little doubt that the very existence of Syria itself is at stake.
The best-case scenario would be a stalemate. The Kurds might consolidate their positions in the oil-rich North East, including Raqqa. If Washington’s support continues even into the Trump presidency, there is little chance of them being overrun. Rojava, the de facto autonomous region they currently control, might be officially declared autonomous, like the KRI in Northern Iraq.
The HTS, with Damascus under its hold, will probably be the new “regime” per se, replacing Assad. Although promises have been made to protect minorities, only time will reveal the governance style they mean to pursue. The Turkish groups could stay where they are, their primary objective to provide a buffer zone for Turkey and prevent an even larger influx of refugees.
The worst-case scenario would be all out civil war like Libya or Iraq, where these factions engulf the country in a second bloodbath. If cooler heads do not prevail, this is the more likely outcome.
Sunnis make up about 80% of Syria’s population, despite Assad being Alawite and having depended heavily on the Alawite belt for his protection.
The Kurds are ready to fight indefinitely for a separate state, which the Turks consider unacceptable, and the two factions have already clashed in Aleppo. On top of this, there are various insurgent groups in the South as well, such as the Southern Front. These create ripe ingredients for sectarian conflict. As stated, none of them like each other.
The geopolitical situation is no less volatile. Right next door, Israel is fighting on multiple fronts and the Golan Heights issue still looms large in Israel-Syria relations.
An outgoing American president has nothing to lose by lighting a match and an incoming one follows no norms, almost as unpredictable as the factions themselves.
Turkey will probably want the new government to take the refugees back, and will consider any refusal as bad as Assad’s refusal. Saudi Arabia is already trying to move in as a facilitator between the stakeholders, given its stature in the Sunni world.
Assad’s allies will also be considering their next moves, now that he is gone. Russia cannot totally disengage, unless it bids a permanent farewell to the Tartus port, a strategic asset it has leased until 2050 or so. It was reported many days ago that Russian ships had already fled, although Moscow’s long-term play is still uncertain.
The same applies to Iran, which cannot afford to disengage, despite having just seen its closest ally crumble in a week.
Beyond all this, we must spare a thought for the civilians killed and displaced in this brutal conflict.
As recently as 2010, Syria had a higher per capita income than many of its neighbours. Since 2011, well over half a million have died and several million displaced. The UNHCR estimated earlier this year that at least 90% of the Syrian population live under the poverty line, conditions which would have certainly worsened in the last week.
One can only hope that the future holds better days. Prime Minister Mohammed Ghazi al-Jalali has pledged to stay and facilitate a transition of power. But what kind of government will this power be transitioned to?
The prospects of a multi-party democracy in West Asia have always been slim, with Israel being the only actual democracy in the region. The sole instance a multi-party democratic system emerged was in Tunisia after the Arab spring, but that too has turned into a failure.
Regardless of what unravels next, the return of stability, even if not complete normalcy, in Syria is critical. Given whom the new rulers are likely to be, things look bleak in that regard, but it must not prevent us from hoping for the best.
