The India-Bangladesh relationship is often viewed through two very different lenses.
In India, the debate centres on security, illegal migration, China’s growing influence and the strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal.
In Bangladesh, the focus is on water sharing, trade imbalance, border killings, sovereignty and being treated as an equal partner.
Neither perspective tells the whole story. Geography has tied India and Bangladesh together in a way that politics cannot undo. The real challenge is not whether the two countries need each other, but whether they can build a mature partnership that accommodates both shared interests and legitimate differences.
India’s support during Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971 laid the foundation for one of South Asia’s most important bilateral relationships. That history still matters, but it cannot sustain the partnership indefinitely.
Most Bangladeshis today have grown up in a country transformed by economic growth rather than shaped by memories of the Liberation War. Their expectations are defined by jobs, education, infrastructure and opportunity.
Bangladesh’s transformation has been remarkable. From a war-ravaged country with weak institutions and widespread poverty, it has emerged as one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies.
Garment exports have powered growth, women’s participation in the workforce has expanded, education and healthcare have improved, and poverty has fallen sharply. Bangladesh is now more confident, more outward-looking and far better placed to shape its own foreign policy.
India has changed as well. Its economic rise and strategic competition with China have made Bangladesh central to its Neighbourhood First policy, Act East strategy and vision for the Bay of Bengal.
India’s Northeast almost surrounds Bangladesh on three sides, making the country indispensable for connectivity between the Northeast and the rest of Asia. Roads, railways, inland waterways and ports in Bangladesh are no longer just bilateral projects; they have become part of India’s wider regional strategy.
That convergence of interests has delivered real results. Rail links have been restored, inland waterways reopened and India has gained access to Chattogram and Mongla ports.
Cross-border electricity trade has expanded, while the Maitree Super Thermal Power Plant and the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline have strengthened energy cooperation. Indian-funded connectivity projects are bringing the two economies closer than at any time since Partition.
Even so, progress has not erased longstanding differences.
The Teesta dispute remains the clearest example. For Bangladesh, it is about irrigation, agriculture and livelihoods. For India, it also involves the interests of West Bengal and Sikkim, making it as much a domestic political issue as a bilateral one. Neither side gains by allowing the dispute to become a permanent source of mistrust.
Bangladesh’s decision to award a Chinese state-owned company the contract to develop an economic zone near Mongla Port, on land originally allocated to India in 2015, reflects how quickly strategic opportunities can shift. The Indian project was dropped in 2025 after years of delays and deteriorating bilateral ties.
Along with Dhaka’s decision to involve China in the Teesta project, it signals Bangladesh’s determination to diversify its partnerships while underscoring the cost of strategic drift in India-Bangladesh relations.
India must demonstrate that difficult issues remain a priority, while Bangladesh needs to recognise the constraints of India’s federal system. A phased approach based on scientific data, joint monitoring and basin-wide management is more realistic than waiting for a comprehensive agreement.
The same balance is needed along the border. India has legitimate concerns about illegal migration, terrorism, trafficking and organised crime. Bangladesh is equally justified in expecting that border management respects due process and human dignity.
Communities along the frontier are linked by rivers, trade and family ties. A secure border cannot become an inhumane one, just as humanitarian concerns cannot be used to overlook criminal activity. Both governments must strengthen verification procedures, intelligence sharing and legal cooperation while reducing violence along the border.
Economic ties also need a new direction. Bangladesh seeks greater market access and fewer non-tariff barriers, while India expects a stable and predictable investment climate.
Both are reasonable objectives. The relationship should now move beyond trade volumes towards joint manufacturing, regional value chains and collaboration in pharmaceuticals, textiles, information technology, engineering, logistics and food processing.
An equally important opportunity lies in education and research.
Universities have remained peripheral to one of South Asia’s most significant bilateral relationships. Scholarships and training programmes have created goodwill, but they are only a beginning. Joint research on river management, climate change, artificial intelligence, agriculture and public health, along with faculty exchanges, shared archives on the Liberation War and collaborative doctoral programmes, would build lasting institutional links.
Climate change is another area where cooperation is no longer optional. Shared rivers, ecosystems and weather systems mean that floods, cyclones, erosion and rising temperatures affect both countries. Future cooperation must extend beyond water sharing to flood forecasting, groundwater management, disaster response and scientific collaboration.
The political transition in Bangladesh in 2024 interrupted the momentum built over the previous decade. The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus sought to broaden Bangladesh’s foreign policy, but its early diplomatic choices created unease in New Delhi.
Differences over Sheikh Hasina‘s presence in India, concerns about minority safety, closer engagement with China and renewed contacts with Pakistan weakened mutual confidence. India, meanwhile, was slow to adjust to Bangladesh’s changed political landscape, reinforcing the perception that it remained tied to the previous dispensation.
The result was not a collapse in relations, but a noticeable erosion of trust that both sides must now rebuild.
That challenge is most visible in Bangladesh’s expanding ties with China. Chinese investment in infrastructure, industry and energy has supported Bangladesh’s economic ambitions and reflects its sovereign right to diversify external partnerships.
India, however, cannot ignore the strategic implications of Chinese involvement in ports, defence and critical digital infrastructure close to its eastern seaboard.
Both positions are legitimate. Bangladesh is entitled to strategic autonomy, but that autonomy must be matched by strategic transparency. India, in turn, must recognise that Bangladesh will continue to engage multiple partners rather than align exclusively with any one country.
The same balance applies to Bangladesh’s renewed engagement with Pakistan. Diplomatic relations are normal, but Dhaka also understands the legacy of 1971 and the dangers posed by extremist networks or intelligence activities that could undermine regional stability.
Both countries must also resist turning each other into domestic political issues. In India, Bangladesh is too often reduced to the migration debate. In Bangladesh, India is sometimes portrayed as an overbearing neighbour whenever domestic politics become contentious. Such narratives may deliver short-term political gains but steadily erode public trust, which is much harder to rebuild than diplomatic ties.
The next phase of India-Bangladesh relations will depend less on headline-grabbing agreements than on a willingness to move beyond old assumptions.
India must treat Bangladesh as a sovereign strategic partner rather than simply a buffer or transit corridor. Bangladesh, in turn, must recognise that India’s concerns over border security, the Northeast, terrorism and strategic competition are genuine and enduring.
History brought the two countries together. Geography ensures they will remain neighbours. The greatest strategic risk for both countries is not disagreement. Democracies will always disagree. The real danger is allowing mistrust to become the new normal
