International organisations once seen as the backbone of global governance are losing credibility as more nations opt for self-sufficiency, bilateral deals, or outright defiance of multilateral rulings.
The shift is driven by stalled mechanisms, political paralysis, and a growing sense that international bodies lack the teeth to enforce decisions.
Canada, historically a staunch supporter of multilateralism, illustrates this change. Long among the top five litigants at the World Trade Organization (WTO), it has often used dispute panels to challenge U.S. trade actions. But between U.S. tariffs under Donald Trump and the disruption caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ottawa is now prioritising deeper military ties with Nordic NATO allies such as Sweden and Finland. It has also begun redesigning its trade and Arctic strategies through direct bilateral mechanisms, signaling reduced reliance on the WTO or the Arctic Council.
India has also shifted stance. Though it once complied with World Bank arbitration on Indus Water Treaty disputes over the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams, it has resisted Pakistan’s efforts to involve the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) since 2016. On August 14 this year, India rejected a PCA ruling that the Indus Water Treaty cannot be revoked, underscoring its determination to manage disputes without third-party intervention.
In Europe, cracks are showing even within one of the world’s strongest supranational legal systems. On August 12, Poland refused to comply with a European Court of Justice ruling striking down a judicial review reform law. Warsaw insisted such decisions were matters of national sovereignty, rejecting the idea of external oversight.
Elsewhere, nations continue to file complaints with international bodies but often pursue their own fixes instead. In 2019, South Korea brought a case against Japan at the WTO, arguing that Tokyo’s export controls violated free trade rules. Months later, the WTO Appellate Body became paralysed after the U.S. blocked judge appointments, leaving the dispute unresolved. Rather than waiting, Seoul rebuilt supply chains by diversifying trade partners and investing in R&D. By 2023, it had largely replaced Japanese suppliers.
The reasons behind this drift are varied but interconnected. U.S. tariffs and protectionist policies undermined trust in the WTO’s ability to safeguard free trade. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the limits of bodies like the UN in restraining powerful states. Meanwhile, institutional gridlock—such as the WTO Appellate Body’s collapse—has left disputes in limbo. For many countries, especially middle powers, bilateral routes now appear faster and more effective than prolonged legal battles.
Even major powers are disengaging. The U.S. has cut funding to several UN agencies and pledged to leave UNESCO and the UN Human Rights Council. Within the EU, Hungary passed legislation to withdraw from the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court, echoing the Philippines’ 2018 departure.
Some leaders are instead pushing for alternatives. Last month, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz called for an EU-led global trade organisation to gradually replace the WTO, an idea backed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Earlier this year, China signed a convention in Hong Kong to establish a new international mediation body, aiming to rival the International Court of Justice and the PCA.
What emerges is a picture of fragmentation: from Canada’s Arctic strategy to India’s water disputes, from South Korea’s supply chains to Poland’s judicial laws, countries are steadily reducing their reliance on multilateral organisations. For now, sovereignty and bilateralism appear to be trumping cooperation through international institutions.
(This article was written by Tisya Sharma, she is an intern at StratNewsGlobal)
